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INTRODUCTION
A longstanding and basic principle of U.S. bankruptcy law is that
a secured  creditor  is  entitled to  receive  the  entire amount  of its se-
cured claim-the  portion of its bankruptcy  claim  that is  backed  by
collateral-before  any unsecured claims are paid.'  This principle  of
full priority2 is generally reflected in the provisions of the  U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code,3 although, as is widely recognized, there are a number of
rules, doctrines, and practices that have the effect of eroding the pri-
ority of secured claims in bankruptcy.4  Until recently, there has been
a  general  consensus  among  economists  and  legal  scholars  that  se-
cured  claims  should be given full priority in bankruptcy  because full
priority promotes desirable  contracting between  borrowers and their
creditors.5  As a result, the rules,  doctrines,  and practices  that  cause
1  We follow the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in using the term "secured claim" to refer to
the portion of a creditor's bankruptcy claim that is fully backed by collateral, and the term
"unsecured claim" to refer to the  portion of a creditor's claim  that is not backed by any
collateral.  11 U.S.C.  § 506(a)  (1994).
2  This Article  uses  the  term  "full priority"  to  mean that, in bankruptcy,  a secured
creditor has  100%  priority  in its collateral  over the  claims of unsecured  creditors.  The
term "unsecured creditors" refers to unsecured creditors that have not explicitly consented
to subordination.
3  The principle  that secured  claims  are to  be  paid in  full before  any unsecured
claims are paid is embodied in the "adequate protection" provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.  11  U.S.C. §§  362-364.  The  principle of full priority  is  also reflected in  the bank-
ruptcy systems  of many  other countries.  See generally DENImS  CAMPBELL,  INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE INSOLvENcY-LAw  (1992)  (surveying national insolvency and bankruptcy laws of
more than twenty countries).  However, an increasing number of foreign bankruptcy sys-
tems provide secured creditors with only partial priority in their collateral over the claims
of unsecured creditors.  See infra note 39 and accompanying  text.
4  See infra Part I.D.
5  Those writing from an  economic  perspective  have  generally operated  under the
premise that full priority yields efficiency benefits and should be respected in bankruptcy.
Much of the scholarly work has focused on what those efficiency benefits might be.  Contri-
butions to  this literature include Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankrupty.
Priority  Puzzle, 22J. LEGAL STUD.  73  (1993); F.H. Buckley,  The Bankruptcy Priority  Puzzle, 72
VA. L. REv.  1393  (1986); David  Gray Carlson,  On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L.
REv.  2179  (1994); Jochen  Drukarczyk,  Secured Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Creditors' BargainCORNELL LAW REVIEW
deviations from full priority in bankruptcy have come under consider-
able criticism.
6
In an article  published last year in the  Yale Law Journal entitled
The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy ("The  Un-
easy  Casd'),7 we  presented  a detailed  analysis  of the economic  costs
that  arise  from  according  full  priority  to  secured  claims  in  bank-
ruptcy.8  One of the main contributions of the article was to show that
full priority could give  rise to inefficient contracting9  between  a bor-
Mode  11  INT'L REV.  L. & ECON.  203  (1991); Thomas  H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman,
Secured Financing  and  Priority  Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.  1143 (1979); Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
Adding Another Piece to the Financing  Puzzle:  The Role of Real  Property Secured Debt, 24 LoY.  L.A.
L. REv.  335  (1991);  Hideki  Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor  Priorities,  80 VA. L.
REv. 2103  (1994);  Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders  in Commercial and Corporate  Settings,
92 YALE  LJ. 49  (1982); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59
U. CHI.  L. RFv. 645  (1992); Alan Schwartz, A  Theory of Loan Priorities,  18J. LEGAL STUD.  209
(1989)  [hereinafter Schwartz  (1989)]; Alan Schwartz,  Security Interests and  Bankruptcy Priori-
ties: A Review of  Current Theories, 10J. LEGAL STUD.  1 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Taking the Analy-
sis  of Security  Seriously, 80  VA.  L.  REv.  2073  (1994)  [hereinafter  Schwartz,  (1994)]; Alan
Schwartz,  The  Continuing  Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37  VAND.  L. Rzv.  1051  (1984);  Robert E.
Scott,  A Relational Theory  of Secured Financing,  86  COLUM.  L. Rzv.  901  (1986);  Paul  M.
Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions,  41 RUrGERS  L. REv.  1067  (1989); Clifford
W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner,  Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Com-
ment, 34J. FIN.  247  (1979); Ren6 M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14J.
FIN. ECON. 501  (1985);  George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions  of Imperfect Informa-
tion, 21 J. LEGAL  STUD.  225 (1992); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy  Resolution:  Direct Costs and
Violation of Piority of Claims, 27 J. FIN.  ECON.  285  (1990); James J. White, Efficiency Justifica-
tions for  Personal  Property  Security, 37 VAND.  L. REv. 473 (1984)  [hereinafter White, Efficiency].
For  a good recent survey  of the law-and-economics literature, see  Barry E. Adler,  Secured
Credit Contracts, in THE NEw PALGRAVE  DICIONARY OF  ECONOMICS AND  THE  LAW (forthcom-
ing 1997).  The view that full priority is socially desirable is shared by many commentators
writing outside of the law-and-economics literature.  See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: TakingDebtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA.
L. REv.  2021  (1994)  (claiming  that full priority is  required  by freedom-of-contract  and
property-rights  principles);  Homer Kripke, Law and  Economics: Measuring  the Economic Effi-
ciency of CommercialLaw in a Vacuum of  Fac  133 U. PA. L. Rzv. 929  (1985)  (arguing that full
priority increases supply of credit);JamesJ. White,  Work and  Play in RevisingArticle 9,80 VA.
L.  REv.  2089  (1994)  (asserting that widespread and longstanding use of security interests
demonstrates  their social desirability).
6  See, e.g.,Jeffrey S. Turner, The Broad Scope of Revised Article 9IsJustifed,  50 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 328  (1996); Weiss, supra  note 5, at 299-300  (discussing effects of violation of
priority); James J. White,  The Recent Erosion of  the Secured Creditor's  Rights Through Cases, Rules
and Statutory Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 53 Miss.  LJ. 384  (1983).
7  Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk  & Jesse  M. Fried,  The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE  L.J. 857  (1996).
8  For a more informal discussion  of the costs of full priority, seeJesse M. Fried, Tak-
ing the Economic  Costs of Priority  Seriously, 51  CONSUMER  FIN.  L.Q. REP.  (forthcoming Fall
1997).
9  In  The Uneasy Case and this Article, we use  the standard Kaldor-Hicks  definition of
economic efficiency.  Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 863-64.  Under this definition,  an
arrangement,  activity, or rule is efficient  to the extent that it maximizes total social wealth
(even if the arrangement, activity, or rule reduces  the wealth of some parties).  SeeJules L.
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFSrRA  L. REv.  509, 513-14 (1980).
An  "efficiency  benefit" increases  total  social  wealth  while an  "efficiency cost" decreases
total social wealth.
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rower and its creditors, and to several types of efficiency costs, even in
a world where all of the borrower's creditors are voluntary and sophis-
ticated.  We also presented  two partial-priority rules that could reduce
the inefficiencies  we  identified  (one  of which  could,  in  principle,
eliminate them).10  We suggested that the two rules of partial priority
be considered  as possible alternatives  to the  principle of full priority
and the ad  hoc system  of partial priority  that currently  governs  the
treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy.
In writing this Article we have two aims.  First, our analysis in The
Uneasy Case has  attracted various  reactions  from  the contributors  to
this Symposium and others,"  and we  wish  to address the objections
that have been raised.  Second, we wish in the Article to develop fur-
ther some of the main elements of the analysis  in  The Uneasy Case.
The four main arguments that have been raised against our analy-
sis-and to which we respond in this Article-appear to be as follows:
(1) that full priority is required by fundamental principles of contract
and property law  (and therefore,  a rule  of partial priority would be
inconsistent with these principles);  (2)  that the economic costs of full
priority are lower than we suggest;  (3)  that even if the economic costs
of full priority are high, the costs associated with a partial-priority rule,
such as the ones we consider, would be even higher  (in particular, a
partial-priority rule would reduce financing for desirable activities, re-
suiting in an economic cost that would far outweigh any benefits); and
(4) that parties could circumvent the partial-priority rules we put for-
ward, and, therefore,  that adoption  of these  rules  would have  little
beneficial  effect.  Critics  suggest  two  ways  in which  borrowers  and
their lenders could circumvent a rule of partial priority in bankruptcy:
(a) through  the use  of arrangements  that have the same  effect  as a
security interest under full priority but which would  be beyond the
reach of a partial-priority rule; and (b) by the secured creditor recov-
ering its collateral outside of, or prior to, bankruptcy.
The analysis  of this Article  is organized  as follows.  We begin in
Part  I by explaining why  the issue  of priority should be  considered
with an open mind.  To that end, Part I first offers a set of intuitions as
to why, in contrast to the views expressed by our critics, full priority is
10  Bebchuk  & Fried, supra note 7,  at 904-11.
11  See, e.g.,  Steven L. Harris  & Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,  Measuring  the Social Costs and
Benefits and  Identifying the Victims of Subordinating  Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82  CORNL.L
L. REv.  1349,  1353-54,  1361-64,  1369  (1997);  Lynn  M.  LoPucki,  Should  the Secured Credit
Carve Out Apply  Only in Bankruptcy? A  Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82  CORNELL L. REv.  1483,
1495-1509  (1997); RonaldJ. Mann,  The First Shall Be Last: A  Contextual  Argument for Aban-
doning Temporal  Rules of Lien Priority,  75 TEx. L. Ray.  11,  45-49 (1996).  Steven L. Schwarcz is
currently in  the process  of writing an  extensive  critique  of The  Uneasy Case  Steven  L.
Schwarcz,  The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 Duoe LJ.  (forth-
coming Dec. 1997).  Because Schwarcz's  article will be  finalized only after publication of
this Symposium issue, we must defer a full response  to some future  occasion.
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not required  by  (and in some  cases  is inconsistent with)  important
principles  of contract, property, and insolvency  law.  Part I then dis-
cusses two important implications of the fact that the current system is
one of de facto partial priority.  The first is that a formal rule of partial
priority would not necessarily be a radical change.  The second is that
those  who  defend  full  priority  by  arguing  that  the  existing  system
works  well  are,  in  fact,  providing  evidence  in  support  of  partial
priority.
Parts  II  and III further  develop  our  claim that full priority can
produce significant efficiency costs and respond in detail to criticisms
of this claim.  Part II focuses on the excessive use of security interests
that results from full priority, and Part III describes the other types of
efficiency  costs associated  with full priority.
Part IV describes  three  partial-priority  rules that should be  con-
sidered  as  alternatives  to  full priority and  the current system  of de
facto partial priority.  In addition to the two partial-priority rules that
we considered in  The Uneasy Case, we offer a third partial-priority  rule
for consideration: giving a secured creditor priority in its collateral in
bankruptcy only over the claims  of unsecured  creditors that have ex-
plicitly consented to be subordinated.
After  describing  how partial priority might be implemented, we
turn to the third and fourth objections that critics of our analysis have
raised.  Part V addresses the  objection  that partial-priority  rules such
as the  ones we present would reduce the  availability of financing for
desirable investments.  Part VI addresses  the  objection  that creditors
can  circumvent a partial-priority  rule  (a) by the use of alternative  ar-
rangements  which  operate  like  security interests  under full priority
but which would be beyond the reach  of the rule; and (b) by secured
creditors  recovering  their  collateral  outside  of,  or  prior  to,
bankruptcy.
Finally, before concluding, Part VII remarks on how our analysis
relates to the current controversies over the revision of Article  9 and
the  "Carve-Out proposal."'12
I
PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS  AND  INITIAL  INTUITIONS
There is a commonly held view, expressed by some participants at
the  Symposium,  that full priority is  required  by freedom-of-contract
and property-rights  considerations.  Indeed, many people  think of a
"security  interest"  as  a  device  that,  by  definition, gives  the  secured
12  See Memorandum from Elizabeth  Wrarren  to the Council of the American Law Insti-
tute  (Apr. 25,  1996)  (on file with the authors)  (proposing Article 9 set aside for unsecured
creditors).
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lender full priority in the collateral over the claims of all third parties,
including unsecured creditors.' 3  To people accustomed to this way of
thinking, the notion of a rule that gives secured creditors only partial
priority over the claims of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy may ini-
tially appear puzzling.  Therefore, we  wish to start our analysis  by of-
fering  a set of intuitive  reasons why  the  issue  of priority  should be
approached with an open mind.14
A "security interest" is simply a legal arrangement that gives the
borrower, the lender, and third parties certain rights which are speci-
fied by law. And although historically those rights in the United States
generally have included the secured lender's  right to full priority in
the underlying collateral, we explain below that no legal principle re-
quires secured lenders  to have full priority over unsecured creditors'
claims in bankruptcy.  Nor is full priority required by economic con-
siderations: in practice, secured creditors in the United 'States already
do not have  full  priority  in bankruptcy,  and many  other countries
have  adopted  rules  that explicitly give secured  creditors  only partial
priority  in bankruptcy.15  Indeed,  the  next two  Parts  explain  why it
might be economically desirable to deny secured creditors full priority
in their collateral in bankruptcy.
Section A explains that, notwithstanding its long history, full pri-
ority is  actually  inconsistent with  an important  general principle  of
commercial law: that a borrower may not subordinate  one creditor's
claim to that of another without the consent of the subordinated cred-
itor.  Section B explains why full priority is not required by freedom-
of-contract considerations.  Section C explains in turn why full priority
is  not  required  by property-rights  considerations.  Section  D  points
out that our system is already one  of de facto partial priority, which
has two  important implications.  First, adopting a formal rule  of par-
tial priority would not necessarily be such a radical change.  Second,
claims that the existing system works well actually support the case for
partial priority, not full priority.  Section E summarizes the arguments
for why the issue of priority should be approached with an open mind.
A.  Full Priority Is Inconsistent with the General Principle
Against Nonconsensual Subordination
Because  most firms entering bankruptcy are insolvent,  the value
available  is generally insufficient to pay every claim in full.  An impor-
13  See William J.  Woodward, Jr.,  The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-
Law Courts, and theArtice 9Reform Process, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 1511,  1511  (1997)  (observing
that " [o]ne of the central, defining features of secured debt is  its priority").
14  The discussion draws on, and further develops, material in Bebchuk & Fried, supra
note 7, at 868-72, 931-34.
15  See infra note 39 and accompanying  text.
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tant purpose of the bankruptcy system is to determine the proper dis-
tribution of that value.  Under the bankruptcy systems of the United
States and many other countries, pro rata sharing is the general rule.' 6
That is, any value that remains after secured claims have been paid in
full  is divided pro rata among those with unsecured claims.' 7  In the
absence  of secured claims, all of the value of the bankruptcy estate is
distributed on a pro rata basis.
A fundamental principle of bankruptcy law is that, once a statuto-
rily-created scheme for allocating a debtor's bankruptcy value among
its creditors is in place, the borrower may not circumvent that scheme
by transferring  one creditor's bankruptcy allocation to  another party
without  the  former's  consent.  For  example,  unsecured  creditor  C1
may not contract with  the borrower for its  claim  to  have priority in
bankruptcy  over  that of another  unsecured  creditor  C2.18  The  law
also does not allow the borrower to  contract with unsecured creditor
C1 to  provide  it  with  preferential  payments  on  the  eve  of bank-
ruptcy.19  Were  the borrower to contract with  creditor  C1  for priority
over creditor  C2 in bankruptcy,  or for preferential payments  outside
of bankruptcy,  the  contract  would be  completely  disregarded  if the
borrower ever entered bankruptcy.20  Indeed, the  only way for credi-
tor  C1 to subordinate  creditor  C2's claim is by negotiating a subordi-
nation agreement with creditor  C2 under which creditor C2 promises
to pay creditor  C1  as much of what creditor  C2 receives in bankruptcy
as  is  necessary  to  make  creditor  C1 whole.  Such  arrangements  are
often observed.  Presumably, the creditor consenting to subordination
receives a higher interest rate from the borrower or compensation  di-
rectly from the subordinating creditor.
There  is,  however,  one  exception  to  the general  principle  that
subordination  must be  consensual:  the borrower  may use  a security
interest, under the  rule  of full priority, to  subordinate  creditor  C2's
16  See generally CAMPBELL,  supra note 3  (surveying bankruptcy systems of a number of
countries).  For  another  possible  method of allocating bankruptcy  value,  see  Schwartz
(1989), supra note  5, at 210-12  (suggesting that earlier creditors  should have priority over
later creditors).
17  Under U.S. bankruptcy law and the laws of most other countries, certain preferred
classes  of unsecured claims  (the claims of certain  government units, certain wage  claims,
inter alia) are paid in full before other "ordinary" or "general" unsecured creditors.  See 11
U.S.C.  § 507  (1994).  For  ease  of exposition,  we assume  throughout  that all unsecured
creditors  are treated equally in bankruptcy.  This  assumption is not critical to any of the
analysis.
18  SeeJames  Steven Rogers,  The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization:
A Study of the Relationship  Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv. L.
REv.  973, 994-95  (1983).
19  See 11  U.S.C. § 547  (1994).
20  See Rogers, supra  note 18,  at 994-95.  Similarly, the law does not permit a borrower
to sell options on its bankruptcy value to noncreditors.  See Buckley, supra  note 5, at 1456 &
n.139.
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claim to creditor Cl's claim.  Thus, while the borrower may not other-
wise subordinate  the claim of unsecured creditor  C2 to that of credi-
tor  C1  without creditor  C2's consent,  the borrower  can achieve  the
identical  result under the rule of full priority by giving creditor  C1 a
security interest.  Given  the general rule that the  borrower may not
give creditor Cl's claim priority over that of a single other creditor, it
would appear peculiar that by complying with a few mechanical proce-
dures, the borrower and creditor  C1 can arrange to give creditor  Cl's
claim priority over the  claims of all unsecured  creditors without  ob-
taining those  unsecured  creditors'  consent.  One  could  argue  that,
although  subordination through  the use of a security interest under
full priority does deviate from the general norm that explicit consent
is  required, unsecured  creditors  implicitly consent to subordination.
The following discussion identifies two possible implicit consent argu-
ments and explains why neither has much force.
The first implicit-consent  argument in  defense  of full priority is
that there  is  implicit consent  to  the creation  of each security  inter-
est.21  In most cases, a security interest created by the borrower  gives
creditor Cl's claim full priority over that of creditor C2 only if creditor
C1 perfects  the security interest by recording  it in a public registry.
Because  the security interest is publicly registered, potential creditors
whose bankruptcy allocations would be reduced by the creation of the
security interest are able to adjust their terms or can refuse to lend in
the first instance.  Consequently, by  entering into  a transaction  with
the borrower,  these creditors  implicitly consent to having  their frac-
tional share of the borrower's  bankruptcy assets reduced.
However,  a substantial number of creditors can neither consent
to nor be assumed  to implicitly agree  to, let alone  know about, the
creation  of every  security  interest  that  subordinates  their  claims.
22
Tort creditors,  for example,  are unlikely to  implicitly agree  to have
their  claims  subordinated  by a  security  interest  giving  the  secured
lender full priority. 2 3  Indeed, under current law, a security interest
could be used to subordinate the claim of an unsecured creditor that
had explicitly refused to subordinate its claim.  Consider a borrower's
agreement  with  creditor  C2 that creditor  C2's claim  would not  be
subordinated  to  that of any other creditor.  Borrowers  and creditors
widely use such agreements.24  However, under full priority, a security
interest created  by the borrower  in violation  of the borrower's  non-
21  See Bebchuk  & Fried, supra note 7,  at 869-70.
22  See id. at 869.
23  We are not claiming that a creditor with a tort claim would never benefit from the
creation of a security interest subordinating  its claim.  In certain cases,  the granting of a
security  interest giving a lender full priority could make a tort creditor (as well as other
nonadjusting unsecured creditors)  better off.  See infra Part II.B.1.
24  See infra Part II.C.2.
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subordination agreement with creditor  C2 will give the secured credi-
tor priority in the collateral over the claim  of creditor  C2.25  Thus, in
the  case of any given security interest, there is not necessarily implicit
consent.
The  second  possible  implicit-consent  argument  is  that  all  un-
secured  creditors  are  better  off  if  the  borrower  has  the  ability  to
subordinate  their claims without obtaining their explicit consent, and
therefore,  all unsecured  creditors would prefer a rule  of full priority
to one in which explicit consent would be required to create a security
interest subordinating their claims.  If so, full priority would efficiently
provide  a  subordination  regime  to  which  all  unsecured  creditors
would agree  (at least ex  ante).  But for this implicit consent-argument
to succeed, those advancing it must show that all unsecured creditors
would be better off under full priority than under any feasible alterna-
five.  The analysis  we  offer in the next two  Parts  suggests  that some
unsecured creditors would be worse off under full priority than under
a rule of partial priority.  These unsecured creditors could not be pre-
sumed  to implicitly consent  to full priority.
Finally,  even if one could show that there  is implicit consent to
subordination, the rule of full priority is still inconsistent with the gen-
eral  requirement  that  consent  to  subordination  be  explicit.  Thus,
those in favor of full priority must explain why subordination through
the  use of a security interest under full priority should not, like  all
other  means  of subordination,  require  the  explicit  consent  of the
subordinated party.
B.  Is Full Priority Required  by Freedom-of-Contract  Principles?
Many  commentators  share  the  sentiment,  which  was  also  ex-
pressed  during  the Symposium,  that freedom-of-contract  principles
require  a rule of full priority.26  To  illustrate  this view,  suppose  that
creditor C1 offers a borrower a choice between  (1) an unsecured loan
to the borrower in exchange for interest payments totalling $15  (plus
repayment of principal) and  (2)  a secured loan in exchange for inter-
est  payments  of only  $10  (plus repayment  of principal)  that, if the
borrower becomes  insolvent, gives  creditor C1 a larger fraction of the
borrower's  assets  (and  creditor  C2,  borrower's  other  creditor,  a
smaller fraction).  The freedom-of-contract  argument asserts  that the
borrower  and creditor  C1  should be free  to  choose  either arrange-
ment (1) or arrangement  (2).
25  See Equitable Trust Co. v. Imbesi, 412 A.2d 96 (Md. 1980)  (holding that mortgagee
had priority in property encumbered  by borrower in violation  of covenant);  see also infra
Part II.C.2  (discussing the uses  of negative  pledge covenants).
26  See Harris & Mooney, supra note, 5,  at 2049-51; Turner, supra note 6, at 329-31.
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In general, if an arrangement would have no  detrimental  effect
on third parties, freedom-of-contract principles would suggest permit-
ting the borrower and creditor  C1  to  enter into the  arrangement if
they  so  choose.27  However,  freedom-of-contract  arguments  are  not
applicable when the arrangement contemplated  by the borrower and
creditor  C1  is at the expense of another party.  In this case,  since ar-
rangement  (2)  is at the expense of creditor  C2, freedom of contract
does not require that the borrower and creditor  C1 be  permitted  to
enter that arrangement.
28
To be sure, it might be argued that arrangement (2)  only appears
to  be at the expense  of creditor  C2 because  while arrangement  (2)
reduces  creditor  C2's fractional  share of the borrower's  bankruptcy
assets expost, relative to arrangement  (1),  arrangement (2)  could actu-
ally make creditor C2 better off than arrangement  (1) ex ante  by lower-
ing the borrower's  interest burden, thereby reducing  the probability
that the borrower will go bankrupt in the first instance. 29  But the fact
that arrangement  (2)  could, in theory, benefit creditor  C2 ex ante (rel-
ative  to arrangement  (1))  does  not mean  that freedom  of contract
requires that the borrower and creditor  C1 be permitted to enter into
that arrangement.  To see why this is the  case, consider two other ar-
rangements that have the same  ex ante and  ex post effects on creditor
C2 as arrangement  (2)  but which are legally unenforceable.
First, suppose that creditor  C1  offers the borrower an unsecured
loan under the same terms as  arrangement  (1)  except that borrower
need pay only $10  in interest payments if it accepts the following pro-
vision:  should the borrower  go bankrupt, creditor  C1 would have an
option to buy its bankruptcy assets up to the value of the balance on
the loan,  at a strike price of $0.  Should  the  option be  exercised,  it
would be at the expense of creditor C2. Most people would agree that
freedom  of contract does not require  the  law to respect such an ar-
rangement and, in fact, the law does not.30
Second,  suppose  that  creditor  C1  offers  the  borrower  an  un-
secured  loan under  the same  terms as  arrangement  (1)  except that
the borrower need pay only $10 in interest payments if the borrower
agrees  that before  bankruptcy,  it must  first pay creditor  C1  in full,
effectively  reducing  the  pro  rata  amount  available  to  creditor  C2.
27  Interestingly, Article 9  itself places restrictions on the types  of arrangements  that
borrowers and lenders can enter into, even if no other parties are involved.  See, e.g.,  U.G.G.
§ 9-502(2)  (1994)  (requiring  secured  lender  to  return  surplus  from  sale  to  borrower,
notwithstanding an  agreement to the contrary).
28  Cf Schwartz  (1994), supra note 5, at 2082  (stating that "society commonly does and
should respect voluntary transactions less" when such transactions  may harm third parties).
29  This point is discussed further infra Part II.B.1.
30  Cf  Buckley, supra note 5, at  1456-60  (discussing prohibition  on issuamce  of bank-
ruptcy rights to noncreditors and shareholders  in particular).
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Again,  most people would agree  that freedom  of contract  does  not
require the law to enforce such an arrangement,  and in fact, such an
arrangement is legally unenforceable.3'
It is easy to see that the option and preference arrangements de-
scribed above have the same ex ante effect on creditor  C2 as the crea-
tion  of  a  security  interest  under  full  priority.  Each  of  the
arrangements  could benefit creditor  C2 ex ante  relative to an ordinary
unsecured loan  by reducing  the probability  of the borrower's  bank-
ruptcy.  But we do not consider the  option and preference  arrange-
ments  required  by  freedom-of-contract  principles.  And  if  these
arrangements  are  not mandated  by freedom  of contract,  then  free-
dom of contract does not require that the borrower  and creditor  C1
be permitted  to  enter into an almost identical arrangement  through
the creation of a security interest giving creditor C1 full priority in the
borrower's  bankruptcy assets.
C.  Is Full Priority Required by Principles of Property Law?
Two types of property-rights  arguments have been raised in favor
of full priority, and against partial  priority.  One focuses  on the  se-
cured  lender's  property  rights  and  the  other focuses  on  the  bor-
rower's property rights.
The  lender-based  argument is  that  a partial-priority  rule  would
take from the secured creditor something for which it paid.  However,
the lender-based argument carries no weight if the partial-priority rule
under consideration  applies only to security interests created after its
adoption.  In this case,  secured  creditors will enter into the  arrange-
ment knowing that they will receive  partial priority, and partial prior-
ity will not defeat their expectations.32
The borrower-based  argument is that the borrower has the right
to alienate its interest in its property in any way it sees fit.33  However,
in granting a security interest in collateral under the rule of full prior-
ity, the borrower is alienating an interest not only in its own property,
but also in the property  of the bankruptcy estate,  which the  law con-
siders to belong to the borrower's creditors as a group (and not to the
borrower).  Because the law does not permit a borrower to  otherwise
transfer  or allocate  its insolvency  assets  to  third parties  or  to prefer
certain creditors, the law is not required to permit the borrower to do
so  through  the use  of a security interest giving  the secured  creditor
31  See 11  U.S.C.  § 547  (1994).
32  For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,
at 931-32; see also Kenneth  N.  Klee, Barbarians  at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren
Carve-Out Proposa4 82  CORNELL  L. REv.  1466, 1476-77  (1997)  (arguing that prospective ap-
plication of partial priority would not constitute an illegal  taking).
33  See Harris &  Mooney, supra note 5,  at 2047-53; Turner, supra  note 6, at 328-29.
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full priority.  Of course, one is free to take the position that the assets
of the  bankruptcy  estate  belong  to  the borrower  and that the bor-
rower should have the right to allocate them however it likes.  But this
would imply that fraudulent conveyance  law, preference  law, and the
rule of mandatory pro rata sharing all violate  the borrower's property
rights.
D.  What Lessons  Can We Learn from the World Around Us?
In this Symposium  and elsewhere,  Steve Harris  and others have
argued that a partial-priority rule would require radically  changing a
system that, in their estimation, works well. 8 4  One implication of this
argument  is that the adoption of a partial-priority  rule is unlikely to
offer  much improvement while creating  a significant degree  of risk.
Another is that advocates of a partial-priority rule bear the burden of
proof in this debate.3 5
To begin, participants on both sides of the priority debate  recog-
nize that we are already operating under a system of de facto partial
priority.36  In particular, there  are  a number  of doctrines,  practices,
and  rules  that  tend  to  erode  secured  creditors'  priority  in  bank-
ruptcy, 7 some of which we briefly discussed in  The Uneasy Case. 38  For
example, because a secured creditor usually cannot seize its collateral
once a firm has filed for bankruptcy, the creditor is subject to the risk
that the value  of the  collateral will fall during the course of a multi-
year Chapter 11  proceeding.  Other countries have gone further, im-
posing formal rules of partial priority in bankruptcy.39
The fact  that we are  already  living in a world of partial priority
has  two very important implications.  First,  the adoption  of a formal
rule  of partial  priority  would  not  necessarily  be  a radical  change.
34  See,  e.g., Harris & Mooney,  supra note 5.
35  See,  e.g., Turner, supra note 6, at 329.
36  See,  e.g.,  Douglas G.  Baird  & Thomas H. Jackson,  Corporate  Reorganizations and the
Treatment of  Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors  in
Bankruptcy, 51  U. Cm.  L. RF1.  97, 112-14  (1984);  Lawrence A. Weiss,  The Bankruptcy Code
and Violations of Absolute Priority, 4J. APPUIED  CoRe.  FIN.  71  (1991); White, supra  note 6, at
392-94; Woodward,  supra  note 13,  at 1516-20.
37  The priority  of secured  claims is  also  eroded  by state  and federal  law outside  of
bankruptcy.  See Klee, supra note 32, at 1474-75 & n.35  (citing state statutes that give  envi-
ronmental creditors priority over mortgagees); WilliamJ. Woodward,Jr.,  The Carve-Out  Pro-
posal and its Critics:  A Response, 30  UCC L.J. 32,  34 (1997)  (describing the judicial tendency
to undermine priority of secured creditors); Woodward, supra  note 13, at 1520 (noting that
state legislatures have dramatically increased the number of statutory lienholders with pri-
ority over secured creditors).
38  Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 911-13.
39  See  id. at 872  n.42;  Theodore  Eisenberg  & Stefan  Sundgren,  Is  Chapter 11  Too
Favorable  toDebtors? Evidence  from Abroad,  82  CORNELL L. REV. 1532  (1997)  (discussing Finn-
ish reorganizations);  Klee,  supra note  32,  at 1477-78  (describing partial-priority  rule re-
cently adopted in Germany).
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Whether the rule would represent a radical change would depend on
the degree  of priority the rule accords secured claims in bankruptcy.
For example, suppose that the aggregate effect of the erosion of prior-
ity currently is, on average, to reduce priority to 90%. 40  In that case, a
regime which imposes a formal partial-priority rule of 90%  and elimi-
nates the  ad hoc erosion would not significantly differ from the  cur-
rent system.41  Indeed, the adoption of such a rule might represent a
less  radical change  than moving from the current system of de facto
partial priority to a system of de facto  100% priority.  Thus, advocates
of partial priority do not necessarily bear a greater  burden of proof
than those favoring full priority.42
The second important implication of the fact that we are living in
a partial-priority world is that those who criticize our analysis by point-
ing to  evidence  that the  existing system  works  perfectly  well  are, in
fact, supporting our claim that partial priority is likely to be superior
to full priority.  The question, however,  is whether changing  the de-
gree  of priority accorded  to secured  claims  in bankruptcy  (and the
way in which the priority system is implemented)  would make the sys-
tem work even better.  To rephrase the question, if currently secured
creditors  receive,  on  average,  90%  of the  value  of their  collateral,
would we be better off under a regime under which that percentage is
lower  (e.g.,  80%)  or even higher  (e.g.,  100%-full priority)?  And if
some degree of partial priority is desirable, should we implement it in
the current ad hoc manner, or should there be,  as there is in a grow-
ing number of other countries,43 an explicit partial-priority  rule?
E.  Considering the Issue of Priority with an Open Mind
In the previous sections, we have tried to show that the principle
of full priority is not required  by fundamental principles  of contract
or property  law;  is  actually inconsistent with important  principles  of
insolvency law; and therefore is not logically, legally, morally, or other-
wise compelling.  We have  also  explained  that, as  a practical matter,
we are not living under a regime of full priority, but rather under one
of partial priority, which means that adoption of a formal partial-prior-
40  Of course,  the actual  degree of erosion  might be greater or less  than  10%.
41  In fact, adoption of a formal partial-priority rule of  90%  (with no further erosion of
priority) would clearly be  superior to  an ad  hoc system of partial priority that cuts back
priority  by an  average of 10%  because  there  would  be less uncertainty.  See Bebchuk &
Fried, supra  note 7, at 912.  In practice, of course, it might be difficult  to eliminate all of
the state and federal rules that operate to erode the priority of secured  claims.  However,
adoption of a formal rule of partial priority might eliminate one source of this erosion by
making  courts  that have traditionally been  hostile to  secured creditors  on  distributional
grounds more inclined to respect security interests.  SeeWoodward, supra note 13, at 1516-
17.
42  See Fried, supra note 8  (manuscript at 5-7); Klee,  supra note  32, at 1468.
43  See supra note 39 and accompanying  text.
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ity rule would not necessarily entail a radical change.  In short, one
should  approach  the  question  of whether we  should  have  a rule  of
partial priority with an open mind.
II
ON THE ExcEssivE  USE  OF  SECURITY INTERESTS  UNDER
FULL PRoRrrY
Those who have expressed concern about full priority in the past
have  generally done  so on fairness and distributional  grounds.44  In
contrast, our analysis in The Uneasy Case has focused on the efficiency
costs of according  full  priority to  secured  claims.  Our view  is  that,
even assuming that efficiency is the sole criterion for assessing the de-
sirability  of full priority,45  full priority would  still be  problematic.46
This  Part develops  and defends  our  claim  that,  under full priority,
security interests will be used  excessively.  What we mean by excessive
use of security interests  is as follows: in a loan transaction that will go
forward  whether or not a security interest is used, full priority may cause
the  parties to  incorporate  an inefficient security interest into the ar-
rangement, a security interest whose use in the arrangement reduces
the total value  available to all parties affected.47
The analysis of the problem of excessive use proceeds  as follows.
Under full priority, the use of a security interest can effect a transfer
of bankruptcy  value from  nonadjusting  creditors-creditors  that do
44  Commentators  critical  of full  priority  on  fairness  grounds  have  included Vern
Countryman,  Code Security Interests in  Bankruptcy, 75  CoM. L.J.  269,  280  (1970);  Grant Gil-
more, The Good Faith  Purchase  Idea and  the Uniform Commercial  Code: Confessions of a Repentant
Draftsman, 15 GA.  L. REv. 605, 620-28 (1981); R.M. Goode, Is the Law Too Favorable to Secured
Creditors
2, 8  CA.  Bus. LJ. 53, 71-73  (1983-84),  and more recently, Klee,  supra  note 32, at
1469-71; LoPucki, supra  note 11,  at 1500-02; Elizabeth Warren,  Making Policy With Imperfect
Information: The Article 9 Full Priority  Debates, 82  CORNELL  L. Ruv.  1373,  1388-92,  (1997);
Woodward,  supra note 37, at 37-38; Woodward,  supra  note  13, at 1525-31.
45  We agree with Bill Woodward that a determination of the optimal priority rule will
also  depend on distributional  considerations.  See Woodward,  supra note  13,  at 1529-30.
Unfortunately, determining  the  distributional effects  of any given rule  in bankruptcy is
likely to be  difficult.  See Douglas  G. Baird,  The Importance of Priority, 82  CORNELL  L.  REV.
1420,  1427-29  (1997).
46  The Uneasy Case provided what we believe  is the first comprehensive analysis of how
full priority can distort a debtor's arrangements with its creditors.  Bebchuk & Fried, supra
note 7.  Other contributions  in this area  include John Hudson,  The Case Against Secured
Lending, 15 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.  47  (1995); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the
Nature of  Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing  and the Creditors'Bargain,  75 VA. L. REv.
155  (1989);  Michelle J.  White,  Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority
Rules, 11  BELLJ. ECON.  550  (1980).  For a brief discussion of this literature, see Bebchuk &
Fried, supra  note 7, at 865 n.27.
47  In  the"  subsequent Part, we will  explain  the efficiency  costs of full priority in the
context of loan  transactions in which  a security  interest would be  used whether  or not
secured  claims are accorded  full priority in bankruptcy,  and in the context in which  the
loan  transaction would not go through  without the use of a security interest  giving the
creditor full priority in the collateral.
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not adjust the terms of their loan to reflect the effect on them of the
creation  of security  interests  which, under  full priority,  completely
subordinate  the  nonadjusting  creditors'  claims  in bankruptcy.  This
transfer of value effectively acts as a "subsidy' for the use of a security
interest  by  reducing  the apparent  cost  (or increasing  the  apparent
benefit) to  the borrower and the secured creditor of using a security
interest.  This "subsidy," in turn, can lead to the use  of inefficient se-
curity interests.
The  problem of excessive use would not arise if incorporating a
security  interest  into  a loan  arrangement  always  adds  value  to  the
transaction  (which, we are assuming for now, would go forward in any
event).  There are, in fact, a number of ways in which the incorpora-
tion of a security interest into a loan contract can add value to such a
transaction.  Most of the ways in which the incorporation  of a security
interest can add value are "priority-independent."  That is, they do not
depend  on the security interest  giving the creditor full priority  over
unsecured  claims  in bankruptcy.  Rather,  they depend  on the  rights
the  security interest  gives the  secured  creditor  against the borrower
and other third parties  (e.g.,  subsequent secured  creditors, transfer-
ees,  and nonordinary-course  purchasers). 48  For example,  a security
interest may enable  the lender to  prevent the borrower from selling
the  collateral  to  another  party  and  inefficiently  squandering  the
proceeds.
49
However, incorporating a security interest into a loan agreement
can  also  give  rise  to various  costs.  Some  of these  costs  are priority-
independent, while others are priority-dependent,  meaning that they
arise only to the extent that secured claims are given priority over un-
secured claims in bankruptcy.50  The priority-independent costs of in-
cluding a security interest in a transaction  that will go forward in any
event include what we  have labelled "contracting costs"-the  costs of
48  For a description of the possible "priority-independent" benefits of incorporating a
security interest into a loan arrangement that will go forward in any event, see Bebchuk &
Fried, supra note  7, at 875-76.  For empirical studies confirming the existence of some  of
these benefits, see RonaldJ. Mann, Explaining  the Pattern  of  Secured Credit 110 HARV.  L. REV.
625  (1997)  [hereinafter Mann, Explaining  the Pattern];  RonaldJ. Mann,  The Role of Secured
Credit in  Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO.  L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 1997)  [hereinafter Mann,
Small-Business Lending]; Scott,  supra note  5,  at 933-52.  There  are  also  potential priority-
dependent  benefits of incorporating  a security interest into a loan  arrangement that will
go forward  in any event  (benefits which  can  arise  only to  the extent secured claims are
accorded priority in bankruptcy),  although we argue that they are of limited importance.
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 913-21.
49  See Baird,  supra note  45, at  1422-23  (explaining  how  reducing secured  creditors'
priority  rights  over  unsecured  creditors  still  leaves  secured  creditors  with  many useful
rights).
50  The priority-dependent  costs of security interests are discussed in Bebchuk & Fried,
supra note  7, at 897-903,  and infra Parts  III.A-B.
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creating  the  security  interest;51  "enforcement  costs"-the  costs  of
monitoring the collateral;52 and "opportunity costs"-the potentially
adverse  effects  of the security interest on the  borrower's  investment
and financing flexibility in  the future.53  When the costs of incorporat-
ing a security interest into  a loan arrangement  exceed the benefits,
the  incorporation  of the  security  interest  into  the loan  agreement
would be value-wasting.  In  this situation, the problem of excessive use
can arise.
54
The rest of this Part provides a detailed analysis of the problem of
excessive  use.  Section A reintroduces the concept of "nonadjusting"
creditors-creditors  that  cannot or  do  not  adjust  the  size  of  their
claims against a borrower to reflect the borrower's arrangements with
other  creditors,  including  arrangements  creating  security  interests
that subordinate  the nonadjusting  creditors'  claims.  Section  B then
explains why the existence of such creditors can lead to the  excessive
use of security interests.  In  Section  C, we  explain why the empirical
evidence shows that the use of a security interest would often be value-
wasting.
A.  The Concept of "Nonadjusting" Creditors
In  The  Uneasy Case, we introduced the concept of "nonadjusting"
creditors.55  A "nonadjusting" creditor is a creditor that, for one rea-
son  or another,  cannot or  does  not adjust the  terms  of its loan  to
reflect the effect on its loan of all the arrangements the borrower en-
ters into with other creditors, including the creation of security inter-
ests  which,  under  full  priority,  completely  subordinate  the
51  Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 877 & nn.69-70.  Contracting costs may be signifi-
cant for some  (but not all)  secured  transactions.  See Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra
note 48, at 659-62; Mann,  Small-Business Lending, supra  note 48,  (manuscript at 30-31).
52  Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 877-78.
53  Id. & n.72.  Opportunity costs can arise whenever a firm  enters into a loan  agree-
ment restricting  its future course  of action, but the use  of the security  interest in the ar-
rangement can make  these costs higher.  See Mann, Explaining  the Pattern, supra  note 48, at
664-67.
54  Some commentators have charged that our analysis either assumes or implies that
the use of secured debt is ordinarily motivated by the desire to limit the assets available to
pay unsecured creditors, and not by the efficiency benefits offered by security interests.  See
Harris & Mooney, supra note 11, at 1354  (citing an unpublished manuscript by David Carl-
son arguing  that we  "posit[]  secured  credit as  a zero-sum  game");  Mann, Explaining the
Pattern,  supra note 48, at 683.  But as we emphasized  in The Uneasy Case (and do so again
here), our analysis assumes that there are both efficient security interests (security interests
whose  efficiency benefits  are  greater than  their efficiency  costs)  and inefficient security
interests  (security interests  whose efficiency  costs  are greater than  their efficiency bene-
fits).  Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 872-73, 878.  Our point has been that the ability of
security  interests under full priority to transfer bankruptcy value from nonadjusting credi-
tors can cause a borrower and a lender to adopt an inefficient security interest.  Bebchuk &
Fried, supra  note 7,  at 896-97.
55  Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 864-65,  882-91.
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nonadjusting creditor's claim in bankruptcy.56  Because this concept is
critical for understanding  the problems with full priority, we want to
make clear the identities of these creditors.
Before  proceeding,  we  wish  to  emphasize  the  following.  Our
point is not that some nonadjusting creditors are "victimized" by prior-
ity.  As we  will see,  some  nonadjusting  creditors  will  be hurt under
priority and others will not.  Our point is simply this: the existence  of
nonadjusting creditors means that, at the moment a borrower is con-
sidering creating a security interest giving a lender priority in the un-
derlying collateral,  the borrower knows that the interest rate charged
by nonadjusting creditors  will be  the same whether  or not  the bor-
rower incorporates  the security interest into  the  loan  arrangement.
This means that the borrower is able to  "sell" the nonadjusting credi-
tors'  share of bankruptcy value to the secured lender in exchange for
a  lower  interest rate,  without  paying  any  additional  interest  to  the
nonadjusting creditors.  As we explained in The Uneasy Case, the ability
to  sell  nonadjusting  creditors'  share  of bankruptcy  value  (whether
those nonadjusting creditors are large banks, small trade suppliers,  or
tort creditors)  creates  a "subsidy" for the use of security interests and
can  cause  a borrower,  under full priority,  to  incorporate  a security
interest into its loan arrangements  even though the security interest is
value-wasting.57  Our  analysis  would  apply  even  if  all  nonadjusting
creditors  receive  an  interest rate that compensates  them, on an  ex-
pected value  basis,  for the  increased  risk of loss  associated  with  the
possibility  of subordination.  For example,  our  analysis  would apply
even  in a world where  the only nonadjusting  creditors  are sophisti-
cated financial  institutions that charge interest rates fully compensat-
ing  them  for  the  additional  risk  of  loss  associated  with
subordination. 5 8  The fact that, in the  real world, many nonadjusting
creditors  are not compensated  for the possibility of subordination  is
completely irrelevant for purposes of our analysis.59
1.  Involuntary Creditors
The classic example  of a nonadjusting creditor is a party that has
been injured by the borrower and that is unable to recover fully from
the  borrower's  insurance  carrier.60  Although  uninsured  tort  claims
56  See id.
57  Id. at 865,  891-95.
58  For an extended  example demonstrating this  point, see  id. at 891-95.
59  See id. at 865.
60  Although most firms purchase insurance, see David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr.,
On the Corporate  Demand for Insurance,  55 J.  Bus.  281  (1982),  the insurance they  purchase
may  not cover all tort claims.  Insurance  companies  typically impose  limits on the scope
and amount of coverage under their policies.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward  Unlimited Shareholder  Liability for Corporate Torts, 100  YALE  L.J.  1879,  1889  (1991);
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do not often surface in bankruptcy, those that do turn up can be sub-
stantial.61  Because  the  claims are fixed by a court without regard to
the borrower's  financial  structure,  the claims  of these tort creditors
cannot  be  adjusted  to  reflect  the  existence  of a  security  interest.
Therefore, the size of the tort claims will neither take into account the
extent to which the borrower has already encumbered  its assets,  nor
be  subject to  adjustment if the  borrower  subsequently subordinates
the  tort  claims  by  issuing  a security  interest.  Thus, in  considering
whether to create a security interest in a loan transaction,  a borrower
can "sell" some  of what involuntary  creditors would receive in bank-
ruptcy  by  creating  a  security  interest  giving  the  secured  lender
priority.
Some commentators have urged that tort creditors should receive
full  compensation  when  the  corporate  torffeasor  goes  bankrupt,
either through a program of mandatory insurance or through the im-
position  of shareholder  liability for  corporate  torts.62  Others  have
suggested that the law give tort creditors priority over secured claims
("superpriority")  in bankruptcy.63  To the extent that any of these re-
form proposals are adopted, the parties could not use security inter-
ests to transfer bankruptcy value from tort claimants, and the problem
of tort creditor nonadjustment would be eliminated.64  But as long as
Lynn  M. LoPucki,  The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80  VA.  L.  REV.  1887,  1907  (1994).  In
addition,  shareholders  have an incentive  to underinsure because  they do not reap all of
the benefits of the insurance  they purchase.  See Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra, at 1889.
Consequently,  firms generally choose low insurance coverage  limits and are often not in-
sured for certain types of risks.  See id. When private  tort claims against the firm do arise,
there  is  thus the  possibility that they will  become  unsecured claims  against  the firm  in
bankruptcy.
61  In two of forty-three large reorganizations  studied by Lynn LoPucki  and William
Whitford, tort claims-in one case for personal injury, and in the other for patent infringe-
ment-amounted  to more than  two-thirds of the unsecured claims  against the bankrupt
company.  See LoPucki, supra note 60, at 1896 n.41  (citing Lynn M. LoPucki & William  C.
Whitford,  Corporate  Governance  in  the Bankruptcy Reorganization  of  Large, Publicly Held Compa-
nies, 141 U.  PA. L. REV.  669, 738 & nn.226-27  (1993)),  1906 n.81  (describing other cases in
which  the  tort liability of bankrupt firms  was far in  excess  of the  applicable  insurance
coverage).
62  See,  e.g., Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note 60, at 1887-90  (proposing unlimited
shareholder liability for corporate torts); S. Shavell,  The  Judgment Proof  Problem, 6 INT'L REv.
L. & ECON. 45  (1986)  (proposing mandatory  insurance).
63  See, e.g., Kathryn R.  Heidt, Cleaning  Up  Your Act: Efficiency Considerations  in  the Battle
for the Debtor's Assets in  Toxic  Waste Bankruptcies, 40  RUTGERS  L. REv.  819,  851-62  (1988);
David W. Leebron,  Limited Liability, Tort  Victims, and Creditors, 91  CoLum.  L. REv.  1565,
1643-49  (1991);  Christopher  M.E.  Painter, Note,  Tort Creditor  Priority in  the Secured Credit
System:  Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36  STAN.  L. REv.  1045,  1080-82  (1984).
64  However,  as we explained  in The Uneasy Case, a mandatory  insurance system  that
permitted the insurer to reach the bankruptcy assets of the tortfeasor firm as an unsecured
creditor in order to recover payments made to  the firm's tort victims would not eliminate
the problem of nonadjustment.  In such a case, mandatory insurance would simply substi-
tute one set of nonadjusting creditors  (insurers) for another (tort creditors).  See Bebchuk
& Fried, supra note 7, at 883 n.94.  While  such a substitution might be desirable  for risk-
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tort creditors are  (1) not fully paid when a tortfeasor firm goes bank-
rupt and  (2)  not given superpriority over secured  claims, a borrower
will be able to "sell" some of the bankruptcy value  that tort creditors
would otherwise receive by creating a security interest that, under full
priority, completely subordinates their claims.
2.  Government Tax and Regulatory Claims
Although tort claims against a bankrupt firm may in some cases
be substantial, 65 in most cases they are not as significant as the claims
of the second group of involuntary creditors-federal, state, and local
government agencies.
At any given  point in time,  firms will  typically  owe payments  to
federal, state, and local governments for corporate income taxes, with-
holding  taxes  on  employees'  salaries,  social  security  contributions,
sales  taxes, property taxes,  excise  taxes, and  customs duties.66  When
the bankruptcy petition is filed, at least some of these taxing authori-
ties will be creditors of the firm for unpaid taxes.  In fact, tax claims
against bankrupt firms are usually substantial, especially in the case of
closely-held  firms.6 7  The government may also  have  environmental,
pension-related,  and  other nontax  claims  against  a bankrupt  firm.
Although  these claims will not, unlike tax claims, be present in many
bankruptcies, they may be substantial when they do arise.68
The size of the government's  claims against a firm is set by statute
without regard to the firm's capital  structure and, in particular, with-
out regard  to  any security  interests  the firm  may  have  created  that
subordinate  the  government's  claims  to  those  of secured  creditors.
Thus, the government is nonadjusting with respect to the creation of
security interests by the firm.  That is, when a borrower and a creditor
must decide  whether  to create  a security interest, the borrower will
treat its  obligations  to  the  government-like  its  obligations  to  tort
creditors-as fixed, and knows that it can "sell" bankruptcy value that
would  otherwise  go  to pay government  claims  to the creditor in ex-
change for a lower interest rate.
During the Symposium,  Steve Harris and Alan  Schwartz argued
that the government should not be considered nonadjusting because
it has the power not only to change the tax laws so that its claims are
"adjusted" for  the  creation  of security interests,  but also  to  change
bankruptcy law so that its claims take priority over those of any other
spreading  reasons, it would not reduce  the problem of excessive  use of security interests
under full priority.
65  See supra note 61.
66  See 11  U.S.C.  § 507(a)(8)  (1994).
67  See Douglas G. Baird,  The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out"Prob-
lem,  72 WASH.  U. L.Q. 913,  915  (1994).
68  See LoPucki, supra note 60, at 1896-97.
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creditor.  However, the ability (in principle)  of the government to be-
come  an adjusting  creditor  is irrelevant.69  We  are  not arguing  that
government claims are inherently nonadjusting.  Nor are we arguing
that the government  is victimized because it does not adjust.
Rather, we are simply pointing out that the government currently
does  not adjust  its claims  to take  into  account  the  effect  on those
claims of the creation  of security interests which, under full priority,
have the effect of subordinating those claims.  Thus, when a borrower
is  considering  the  creation  of a security  interest  giving the  secured
creditor priority, it knows that it can lower its overall interest burden
by "selling" some  of the bankruptcy value that would otherwise  go to
the government in exchange for lower interest payments.
3.  Voluntary Creditors with Small Claims
Involuntary creditors-tort creditors and government agencies-
are not able to adjust the size of their claims against a borrower when
it creates a security interest in favor of another creditor, because  their
claims are  fixed by  law.  But the fact that a creditor voluntarily  con-
tracts with  a firm  does  not necessarily  make  that creditor adjusting
with respect to a particular  security interest which  the firm has  cre-
ated.  Many of a firm's voluntary creditors  are  customers,70  employ-
ees,71 and trade creditors that have relatively small claims  against the
firm.  Even though these creditors can, in principle, take the existence
of a security  interest into  account in  contracting  with  the firm,  the
small size of their claims will generally make it rational for them not to
do so.
7 2  Even trade suppliers, which are more commercially sophisti-
69  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 884 n.95.
70  Customers may be owed money for payments made toward purchases of goods or
services.  For example, ticketholders  had substantial  unsecured claims against Braniff Air-
lines when it went bankrupt.  See LoPucki, supra note 60, at 1896 n.41:
71  See 11  U.S.C. § 507(a) (4),  (b)  (1994).
72  As we explained  in  The Uneasy Case  the.cost to any creditor of adjusting its terms
with a firm to reflect accurately its risk of loss in connection with lending to that particular
firm is substantial, while the benefit of such an adjustment is  minimal.  Bebchuk & Fried,
supra note  7, at 885-86.  Determining  the  extent of a firm's secured debt  will be quite
difficult.  For example, although  public registries identify  the class  of assets  subject to  a
security  interest, they do not indicate  the  size  of the loan secured  by the collateral.  See
Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing  and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J.  LEGAL STUD.  53,
54-55  (1983)  (describing lack of information  conveyed  by the Article 9  notice  filing sys-
tem).  Even if a creditor with a small claim could costlessly acquire  information about the
firm's secured debt, the creditor would still be required to estimate the firm's likelihood of
insolvency, its insolvency value, and the extent of  its unsecured debt in order to estimate its
risk of loss.  Finally, a creditor which had undertaken such an investigation would face the
additional cost of contracting specialized terms with the firm.  However, the amount owed
to  each of these  creditors individually-and  thus the  expected loss  faced by each  credi-
tor-is typically small.  Thus, the benefit to  these creditors of acquiring information  and
negotiating special terms with the firm each time  they extend  credit will be minimal.  See
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,  at 885-86.
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cated than employees and customers,  are believed to have neither the
time  nor  the  expertise  to  evaluate  individual  firm  risk.73  Indeed,
trade creditors generally charge uniform interest rates  to all custom-
ers  that are  allowed  to  purchase  on  credit,74  indicating  that those
creditors do not set the interest rate  to take into account the particu-
lar risk of loss  associated with lending to each  customer.
The failure of creditors with small claims  to take into account a
borrower's  arrangements  with  other  creditors  does  not  imply  that
these creditors are  systematically undercompensated  for bearing  the
risk that other  creditors  of the borrower will have priority  claims in
bankruptcy.  Experienced trade creditors probably set terms that com-
pensate them for the average risk of loss they face in lending to all of
their  customers.  However,  whether  or not  these  creditors  are  ade-
quately compensated for their risk of loss is not relevant to  our analy-
sis.  The  point  is  simply  that,  when  deciding  whether  to  create  a
security interest giving a lender priority in the underlying  collateral,
the borrower  knows that the  decision will not affect the interest rate
charged by creditors with small claims.  Thus, the borrower can obtain
a lower  interest rate  by selling  the bankruptcy  value  to which  these
creditors would otherwise  be entitled.75
73  See  Hudson,  supra note  46,  at 56;  Mark J.  Roe,  Commentary on  "On the Nature of
Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy, Priority, and  Economics, 75 VA.  L. Rxv. 219,  225  (1989)  (comment-
ing on  Thomas  H. Jackson  & Robert  E.  Scott,  On the Nature of Bankruptcy:  An Essay  on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'  Bargain, 75 VA.  L. REv.  155  (1989)).
74  See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram  G. Rajan,  The Benefits of Lending Relationships:
Evidence  from Small Business Data,  49 J. FIN. 3,  23-25,  32  (1994).
75  For an  extended  example, showing why  it might be  rational for creditors  lending
relatively  small amounts to  ignore  the capital structure  of their borrowers  in fixing their
interest rates, giving some borrowers an incentive to create value-wasting security interests,
see Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7,  at  886-87.  In  his Symposium  article,  Alan  Schwartz
criticizes our example.  He appears to make three arguments.  First, Schwartz charges that
our example assumes, but does not show, that there are creditors that will charge the same
interest rate  to all of their borrowers.  Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and  Priority in Bank-
ruptcy, 82  CORNELL  L.  REv.  1396,  1415  (1997).  However,  there  is uncontested  empirical
evidence that trade creditors do in fact charge borrowers to which  they extend credit the
same interest rate, suggesting that they are unable  (or unwilling) to  differentiate  among
these borrowers.  See supra note 74 and accompanying  text.  Our example  is designed  to
explain why it might be rational  for trade  creditors  to behave  this way, and why the ob-
served failure of trade creditors  to charge different rates of interest to different borrowers
can cause some  borrowers to  create inefficient security interests.
Second, Schwartz argues that our example fails to explain why lenders would not even-
tually learn which  types of borrowers  issue secured debt and which ones do not, and then
set  their  interest  rates  accordingly.  Schwartz,  supra, at  1415.  The  explanation  is  that
whether or not a particular borrower creates a security interest may depend notjust on the
borrower's industry (e.g.,  retail, manufacturing),  but also on the particular situation of the
borrower at the time  it must decide whether to borrow on a secured or unsecured basis,
including, among other things, its pre-existing  capital structure and  the availability of as-
sets that can serve as collateral.  Thus, at any given time, there is likely to be variation in the
use of security interests within an industry, and over time there  is likely to be variation in
the use of security interests by a single firm.  A creditor lending a small amount of money
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4.  Prior  Voluntay Creditors
We  have just seen  that involuntary  creditors  cannot adjust  and
that voluntary creditors with  small claims  generally  do not adjust to
the security interests created by a borrower  (although some voluntary
creditors with small claims may charge an interest rate that compen-
sates  them  ex  ante for the risk of subordination  in  bankruptcy).  In
contrast, voluntary creditors with larger claims may find it worthwhile
to adjust the interest rate  they charge  to  take into account  the  exis-
tence  of a security interest which, in the event of bankruptcy, would
give the secured creditor priority over their claims.  However, a sophis-
ticated unsecured creditor with a large claim can adjust only to secur-
ity  interests  which  the  borrower  has  already  created.  Thus,  even
voluntary creditors with large claims will be nonadjusting with respect
to subsequently created security interests.  Again, the point is not that
the voluntary creditor is "hurt"  by the subsequent creation of a secur-
ity interest giving another creditor priority; the voluntary creditor with
a large claim would be expected to take into account the possibility of
the subsequent  creation  of a  security interest  in setting  its  interest
rate.  The point is that, when the borrower is deciding whether or not
to create a security interest in favor of a lender, it knows that the deci-
sion will not affect the interest rate charged by pre-existing unsecured
creditors lending at fixed  rates.
One might ask why a voluntary creditor with a large claim would
ever  allow  itself  to  become  a  nonadjusting  creditor.  That  is,  why
would the creditor fail  to simply require  that the borrower  covenant
not to grant security interests during the term of the loan?  Indeed, as
discussed below,  sophisticated  creditors frequently negotiate  a nega-
tive pledge  covenant  restricting  their  borrowers'  ability  to issue  se-
cured debt.76  The question then is why sophisticated creditors do not
always use such covenants when extending a large amount of credit to
a borrower.  We  can offer three reasons for this phenomenon. 77
First,  a  negative  pledge  covenant  may  be  inefficiently  broad.
Consider the case of an unsecured creditor lending to a borrower that
anticipates  issuing both efficient and inefficient security interests.  If
(a) the aggregate  efficiency loss from preventing the  creation of effi-
cient security interests would be greater than the aggregate efficiency
benefit from preventing the  creation  of inefficient  security interests;
would not find it worthwhile to investigate the particular circumstances  of each firm every
time it extends credit.
Third, Schwartz  argues that borrowers with little  or no secured debt would  have an
incentive to signal  this fact  to  prospective  lenders.  Schwartz,  supra, at 1415-16.  We  re-
spond to this argument infra Part II.B.3.
76  See infra Part  II.C.2.
77  For a more detailed discussion,  see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 888-91.
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and (b) the creditor and the borrower would bear all of the costs and
enjoy all of the benefits of a negative  pledge covenant, then the par-
ties will not find it worthwhile  to adopt a negative  pledge  covenant,
even though the  borrower may later create  an inefficient  security in-
terest subordinating  the unsecured lender's claim.
Second, even when a negative pledge  covenant would not be too
broad, the unsecured lender and the borrower will not use it if they
cannot capture enough of the benefit that would be generated by the
covenant.  To the extent that the borrower  has other  (nonadjusting)
unsecured  creditors, some of the benefit  of the arrangement will be
captured  by  these  other  creditors. 78  If  the  borrower  and  the  un-
secured creditor contemplating the use of a negative pledge covenant
do not capture enough of the benefit to outweigh  the costs they must
bear, they will not adopt it even if it would  create value.79
Third, even if a negative  pledge covenant  (a) would create value
and  (b) would (if enforceable)  privately benefit the borrower and the
unsecured lender, the parties may not use it if-as is often the case-
the  lender believes  that  such  a  provision  would  be  difficult  to  en-
force.80  Under current law,  the  claim of an unsecured  creditor that
has bargained for a negative pledge  covenant would be subordinated
by a  security interest created in violation  of a negative  pledge  cove-
nant.81  In many cases, the lender would have difficulty preventing the
borrower from creating such a security interest and then determining
that such a security interest had been created.82
78  Because  these other creditors are nonadjusting, the adoption of a negative  pledge
covenant  in  the loan  arrangement  will  not cause  them  to  lower  the interest  rates  they
charge  the borrower.  As a  result, the borrower  will not capture  any of the benefit that
would accrue  to these  creditors.
79  Thus, the failure  of a borrower  and an unsecured  creditor to negotiate a negative
pledge covenant, the failure of a negative pledge covenant to ban all types of secured debt,
or the willingness of an unsecured creditor to waive a negative pledge covenant does not,
unlike some  commentators have argued, prove  that the parties expect  that it will be  effi-
cient for the borrower to  create  the security  interests that the unsecured creditor fails to
prohibit.  See Schwartz, supra  note 75, at 1397.  For further discussion of the inferences that
one can draw from negative  pledge covenants, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 922-
23; infra Part II.C.2.
80  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,  at 888.
81  See id. at 889 n.116 (citing Equitable Trust Co. v. Imbresi, 412 A.2d  96  (Md. 1980)
(holding that mortgagee  had priority in property encumbered  by borrower in violation of
covenant));  Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 48,  at  643.  One  commentator  has
proposed making recorded  negative  pledge  covenants  enforceable  against  third parties.
See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Reflections on Making Negative Pledge
Covenants  Perfectible  56-57  (Aug.  8,  1997)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file with  au-
thors).  We  think that his proposal  deserves serious consideration.
82  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 888-90. The creation of a security interest will
be undetectable for as long as the security  interest is not perfected  (recorded).  In many
cases, it will also be difficult to detect a recorded security interest.  See Mann, Explaining  the
Pattern,  supra note 48, at 643.
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A negative  pledge  covenant  is not the only method that an un-
secured  creditor  could  use  to  ensure  that  it  does  not  become
nonadjusting with respect to a subsequently created security interest.
For example, sophisticated unsecured creditors could build an adjust-
ment  mechanism  into  their contracts  with  borrowers  which  allows
them to  reset the interest rate  if a borrower  subsequently  creates  a
security interest.  Unlike  a negative  pledge covenant,  an adjustment
mechanism negotiated between an unsecured lender and a borrower
does not prevent the borrower from creating a value-creating security
interest: it merely increases the cost of doing so.  As long as the cost is
not so high that it precludes  the creation  of the security interest, the
adjustment mechanism, unlike a negative pledge covenant, would not
be overbroad.  Nor would such a mechanism confer a benefit on any
other creditors.  Thus, the parties would be more likely to  adopt an
efficient  adjustment mechanism than a negative  pledge covenant.
Although  sophisticated  creditors  with  large  claims  might  find
such  mechanisms  worthwhile  in  principle,  adjustment  mechanisms
are generally considered  to be impractical.83  Given that the appropri-
ate adjustment factor for each security interest would depend on nu-
merous  parameters-such  as  the  likelihood  of  the  borrower's
insolvency"-that would be realized only at the time the security inter-
est is created, it would be extremely difficult to specify the appropriate
schedule of interest rate adjustments in advance. 84  Moreover, such a
contractual provision-like a negative pledge covenant-might be dif-
ficult to enforce  against smaller companies  that  can  easily conceal  a
financing  transaction  and that may lack the fimds to pay the adjust-
ment once the transaction is discovered.  Thus, even if an appropriate
adjustment schedule  could be  specified in advance  at no cost, there
might be situations in which a sophisticated creditor would not reduce
Because an unperfected  security  interest would not give the secured lender priority
over the negative  pledge lender (once the lender obtains ajudgment lien),  some readers
questioned our claim that an "'informal creditor'  [e.g., a friend or family member of the
business owner] need not perfect its security interest for its claim to have priority over that
of the  [negative pledge]  unsecured lender."  Bebchuk & Fried,  supra  note 7, at 888.  We
made this claim because  between the time that  (1) the negative pledge lender discovers
the security interest and  (2)  the negative pledge lender obtains a court judgment against
the borrower (which might be months, or longer), the secured creditor would have time to
perfect the security interest (giving it priority over the negative pledge lender) or simply to
seize the collateral  (making it unavailable to the negative pledge lender).  Thus, our claim
is that the "informal" creditor need not perfect  its security  interest for its claim  to have
effective priority over  that of the unsecured lender.
83  See,  e.g., Kanda & Levmore, supra note 5, at 2112  (observing that variable interest
rate arrangements impose high transaction costs).
84  Although the parties could instead renegotiate  the terms of the loan contract fol-
lowing the creation of each security interest, it would be costily for the parties to verify the
appropriate parameters and bargain  over the adjustment every time after the creation of a
security interest.  Such a scheme would therefore  also not be practical.
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the interest rate it charged a borrower in exchange for an adjustment
mechanism.
In any event, even if some prior sophisticated creditors with suffi-
ciently large claims did adopt such an interest rate adjustment mecha-
nism, other prior creditors would be nonadjusting with respect to the
subsequent  creation of security interests by the borrower.  Thus,  the
borrower would still have an incentive-albeit a reduced one-to cre-
ate security interests in order to transfer value from prior nonadjust-
ing creditors.
We again want to emphasize that, while prior voluntary creditors
might not be able to adjust to the creation of a security interest by a
borrower,  we  are  not assuming  that they are  exploited by  the bor-
rower.  In fact, we are willing to assume that prior creditors anticipate
the risk that subsequent security interests will subordinate their claims
in bankruptcy  and set their interest  rates  accordingly.  The only  as-
sumption on which  our analysis depends is that the terms negotiated
by almost all prior creditors,  however set, are  fixed by the  time  the
borrower and a potentially secured creditor negotiate their loan trans-
action.  Thus, when the borrower and the potentially secured creditor
shape their arrangement, the use of a security interest giving the cred-
itor a secured claim with full priority-compared  to an arrangement
without such a security interest-can make the borrower better off by
allowing it to "sell" to the creditor bankruptcy value that would other-
wise be enjoyed by these prior nonadjusting creditors.
B.  Nonadjusting  Creditors and the Use of Inefficient Security
Interests
1.  The Problem
We are now ready to  consider how full priority and the presence
of nonadjusting  creditors  affect the  incentives  of a borrower  and  a
creditor contemplating  the  use  of a security  interest in  connection
with  a loan  transaction  that  will proceed  whether  or not a security
interest is used.  Recall that the steps in the analysis are as follows:  (1)
under full priority, the use of a security interest can effect a transfer of
bankruptcy  value  from  nonadjusting  creditors;  (2)  this  transfer  of
value acts as a subsidy for the use of a security interest by reducing the
apparent cost (or increasing  the apparent benefit)  of using a security
interest  to the  borrower and the secured creditor; and  (3)  this "sub-
sidy"  can lead  to the  use  of inefficient  security interests.  Below, we
provide  a simple  example to  illustrate  these points.8 5
To  begin, suppose that a borrower and creditor  C1  are contem-
plating incorporating a security interest  into their loan arrangement.
85  For a more extended treatment,  see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 891-95.
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Under full priority, one effect  of incorporating  a security interest is
that, everything else equal, in the event of bankruptcy, creditor Cl will
receive  more than  it would without the security  interest, and  other
creditors  will receive  less.  Everything  else  equal,  creditor  C1  should
therefore be willing to charge  the borrower a lower interest rate.  To
the extent that the borrower's  other creditors are adjusting, the bor-
rower will be required to  "pay" for transferring the bankruptcy value
from  these  creditors  to  creditor  Cl through  a higher  interest rate
charged by these other creditors.  But at least some of the borrower's
creditors will be nonadjusting.
Suppose that the presence  of nonadjusting creditors means that,
by creating a security interest in favor of creditor C1, the borrower can
"sell" $10 of expected bankruptcy value to creditor Cl in exchange for
a lower interest rate without "paying" for the transfer through higher
interest  rates  to  nonadjusting  creditors.  The  transfer  of $10  in  ex-
pected bankruptcy value to creditor  C1 should, everything else equal,
cause creditor C1 to reduce the interest it charges the borrower by the
same amount-10.  From the borrower's  point of view, this transfer
reduces the apparent cost of creating the security interest by $10  (or,
equivalently,  increases  the  apparent benefit  of creating  the  security
interest by $10).
The  fact  that  the  security  interest  would  transfer  $10  from
nonadjusting creditors  to the  borrower  may, in  turn, affect the bor-
rower's decision whether to grant creditor C1 a security interest.  Sup-
pose, for example, that the creation of the security interest would give
rise to  an efficiency  cost of $15  and provide  an  efficiency benefit of
$10  and that the borrower and creditor  C1 would bear all of the effi-
ciency costs and capture  all of the efficiency benefits.  Such a security
interest would be value-wasting.  If all of the creditors were adjusting,
the borrower and creditor  Cl would not have an  incentive  to adopt
the security interest because, without the transfer, the security interest
would impose a net cost of $5.  However, if the effect of the security
interest is to transfer $10  from nonadjusting  creditors, the  borrower
and creditor  C1 will have an incentive  to adopt the security interest.
The reason  is  that the  benefit to  the  borrower  and creditor  C1  of
adopting it appears  to be  $20  (rather than  $10),  an amount greater
than the cost of $15  (or, equivalently, the cost appears  to be only $5,
less than  the benefit of $15).
Before  proceeding,  we  would  like  to  emphasize  two  important
points.  First, we are not arguing that the incorporation  of a security
interest into a loan transaction  (that will go forward in any event) will
always  have  the  effect of transferring  value from nonadjusting credi-
tors.  The creation  of a security interest giving  the  secured  creditor
bankruptcy  priority  will,  everything  else  equal, transfer  value  from
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nonadjusting  creditors by reducing  their fractional share of the bank-
ruptcy pie.  But, as we have emphasized,  the incorporation  of such a
security interest into a loan agreement will also affect unsecured credi-
tors in two other ways:  (1) by affecting the probability that the borrower
will fail and (2)  by affecting the amount of assets that will be available
in the event of bankruptcy.  Depending on the circumstances,  the use
of  a  particular  security  could  either  increase  or  decrease  the
probability of failure,  and either increase  or decrease  the amount of
assets that will be available  to creditors as a group.8 6  Thus, the use of a
security interest under full priority in connection with a loan transac-
tion  that will go forward in any event will make unsecured  creditors
better  off overall  if the  subordination  effect  is  outweighed  by  the
other two  effects.
87
But by  the  same  reasoning, unsecured  creditors  may be, in  an
even worse position after the creation of a security interest than if the
only effect of the security interest were to reduce their fractional share
of the borrower's bankruptcy assets.  In particular, and as we explain
in the next Part, under full priority, the  incorporation  of a security
interest not only subordinates  the  claims of unsecured  creditors, but
by reducing the incentive of the secured creditor to monitor the bor-
rower,  may  also  increase  the  probability  of failure  and  reduce  the
amount of assets  that are  available  to  pay all claims  in the event of
default.  That is,  the  incorporation  of a security interest into  a loan
agreement  may make  unsecured  creditors worse  off in not one, but
three ways:  (1) by increasing the probability of the borrower's failure;
(2)  by reducing the amount of assets that will be available to all credi-
tors in  the event the borrower fails;  and  (3)  by reducing  unsecured
creditors'  fractional share of these assets.
86  The use of a security interest will tend to increase the probability of failure and/or
reduce the amount of assets that are available to creditors as a group, to the extent that the
security interest imposes priority-independent costs on the borrower  (including "opportu-
nity costs"); see Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 872-73; supra notes 50-54 and accompany-
ing text; and to the extent that the protection provided by the security interest reduces  the
lender's incentive to monitor the borrower.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 897-903;
infra Part III.A.  The use of a security interest will tend to decrease the probability of failure
and/or  increase  the  amount of assets  that  are available  to  creditors  as  a group,  to  the
extent that it permits the lender to better control the actions of the borrower (e.g, prevent
the borrower from selling the collateral and transferring the proceeds to its shareholders).
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,  at 876.
87  A related but distinct point is  that the use of a security interest under full priority,
in connection with a transaction that would not go forward under less than full priority can
also make unsecured creditors better off.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 919-20.  In
Part V, we  will address  the efficiency  effects  of priority on  transactions  that will  not go
forward unless there is full priority, where we will point out that full priority can also make
unsecured  creditors worse off by enabling inefficient transactions to go forward.  For now,
however, we continue to focus only on transactions that would go forward whether or not a
security  interest is used.
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The second point to be  emphasized is  that a particular security
interest's  potential,  under  full  priority,  to  transfer  value  from
nonadjusting creditors does not mean that the borrower and a poten-
tially secured creditor would always have an incentive to use the secur-
ity interest.  The borrower and the potentially secured creditor would
have an incentive to use the security interest only if the efficiency ben-
efits they capture from the security interest, plus the (expected) trans-
fer of value from nonadjusting creditors,  is greater than the efficiency
costs they will bear from the use of the security interest.  Thus, the fact
that a  security  interest  under full  priority  can  transfer  value  from
nonadjusting  creditors  does  not  imply  that  lenders  and borrowers
would  always use security interests in their loan arrangenients.88
2.  Excessive  Use Can Occur Without Involuntary Creditors
The  presence  of nonadjusting  creditors  can lead  to  the use  of
value-wasting security interests, whether or not nonadjusting creditors
are hurt.89  To see why value-wasting security interests might be used
under full priority, even though no involuntary nonadjusting creditors
are hurt, suppose that, in the example above,  all of the nonadjusting
creditors are voluntary.
Suppose, for example,  that all of the nonadjusting creditors are
large  unsecured lenders  that have  lent at fixed  interest rates before
the borrower faces the decision of whether to create a security interest
as part of its loan arrangement with creditor  C1. Suppose further that
the security interest will have  the effect  of, among other things,  in-
creasing the expected value of creditor Cl's bankruptcy claim by $10,
and reducing that of the nonadjusting creditors' bankruptcy claims by
the same amount.
In principle, the creditors extending large loans to the borrower
before  the  borrower  enters  into  a transaction  with  creditor  Cl  can
compensate  themselves  ex ante,  via a higher interest rate, for the possi-
bility  that, when  the borrower  and creditor  C1 negotiate  their loan
arrangement,  the borrower will  create a security interest that, every-
thing  else  equal,  reduces  the  expected  value  of their  bankruptcy
claims  by $10.  So while  the incorporation  of a security interest into
the loan arrangement with creditor  C1 will, at that time, make these
nonadjusting creditors worse off than if a security interest is not incor-
porated into the loan  arrangement,  they will  not be worse  off than
they would have been in a world where  there is no priority because
88  Consequently, the failure of borrowers to secure all of their assets does not, as Alan
Schwartz has argued, Schwartz, supra  note 75, at 1410-11,  prove that borrowers cannot use
security interests to transfer value from unsecured creditors.  For further discussion on the
inferences that can be drawn from the use of unsecured debt  see  infra Part Iifc.i.
89  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 891-95.
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they will  have  been compensated  for the  risk of subordination  by a
higher interest rate.  Nonetheless, because the terms of their loans will
not be adjusted if creditor  C1 gets a security interest, there will still be
a subsidy in favor  of using a security interest, and this subsidy could
lead to the use of a security interest even if it reduces the total value of
the  transaction.
3.  Can Disclosure by Borrowers Eliminate the Problem of Excessive
Use?
In his  Symposium  article,  Alan  Schwartz  makes  the  point that
although it may not be worthwhile for creditors with small claims  to
determine  whether  a  borrower  has  created  security  interests  that
would subordinate  their  claims in  the  event of bankruptcy, the bor-
rower could provide such information to these creditors at low cost.90
Firms that have not created security interests would, Schwartz argues,
have, an incentive to bring this to the attention of creditors with small
claims  in order to induce the  lenders  to lower their interest  rates.91
This  information  would  permit  lenders  with  small  claims  to  adjust
their interest rates  to  reflect the  existence  (or non-existence)  of par-
ticular security interests.92  The  implication  of Schwartz's  analysis  ap-
pears  to  be  twofold.  First,  to  the  extent  that  borrowers  already
provide this information  to creditors with small claims, the amount of
nonadjustment may not be as large as we suggest, at least with respect
to  creditors with small  claims.  Second,  to  the  extent that borrowers
do  not find  it worthwhile  to  provide  this information,  we  can  infer
that the  amount of nonadjustment by  creditors with small  claims  is
fairly  small because,  otherwise,  borrowers  with  little secured  debt in
their financial structure would have an incentive to notify creditors of
that fact.
Of course, Schwartz's point is applicable with respect to only one
of  the  four  groups  of nonadjusting  creditors-creditors  with  small
claims.  Clearly,  notification  would  not  cause  involuntary,  govern-
ment, or prior  creditors  to  become adjusting.  The  absence  of bor-
rower-notification  would  also  not  indicate  that  the  amount  of
nonadjustment by these three other classes  of nonadjusting creditors
is insignificant.
Moreover, notification is unlikely to be able to  cost-effectively re-
duce  nonadjustment  (and, therefore,  the  absence  of notification  is
not likely to indicate  that the magnitude of nonadjustment  is small)
for creditors with small claims that could in principle adjust the size of
their claims to take into account the existence of previously-issued  se-
90  Schwartz,  supra note 75,  at 1408,  1415-17.
91  Id. at 1415.
92  See  id. at 1415-16.
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cured debt in  the borrower's  financial  structure.  The cost  of effec-
tively communicating one's financial structure to these creditors may
not be insignificant.  First, the borrower will have an incentive to mis-
lead because the borrower would face liability only in the event it can-
not pay its creditors,  at which point, any additional  liability is  of no
consequence.  Thus  there must be a third party involved to  provide
verification.93  Second, accuracy would require that disclosure be con-
tinuous;  otherwise, lenders would suspect that, since the previous dis-
closure, the borrower had significantly changed its financial structure
to their detriment.  Third, and most importantly, even if the borrower
could cheaply provide up-to-date accurate information about its finan-
cial  structure, creditors with small claims would still bear the  cost of
assessing  the information provided by the borrower  and the cost of
negotiating special  rates.  When  the amount of the loan,  and there-
fore the expected risk of loss,  is relatively small, it will simply not be
worthwhile for the creditor to incur these processing and negotiation
costs.  Moreover,  even  in the  absence  of those  costs, many creditors
with small claims-including  the borrower's  employees  and custom-
ers-are not sophisticated  enough  to adjust the  (implicit)  rate they
charge a borrower to take into account the existence or non-existence
of secured debt in the borrower's  financial structure.
In short, borrower disclosure is unlikely to convert creditors with
small claims into adjusting creditors, and in any event could not cause
the  other  three  classes  of nonadjusting  creditors  (tort creditors,  the
government, and creditors with prior claims)  to become adjusting.
C.  Empirical  Evidence That Security Interests Are Often
Inefficient
We have shown that borrowers and creditors might create secur-
ity interests even if they are inefficient.  The question remains whether
there are many cases in which security interests actually are inefficient.
In this Section, we  present empirical  evidence  indicating that this is
the  case.
1.  The Persistence of Unsecured Debt
Although there is very little data on the extent of secured lending
in the U.S. economy, there is no question that it is an important form
of financing for many companies.  Almost 30%  of the  dollar volume
of commercial bank loans is secured.94  Of course, the same data also
93  Much of this information is available through Dun & Bradstreet,  UCC filings, and
other sources.  But often  these sources  are not accurate.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note
7, at 885  n.103; Mann, Explaining  the Pattern,  supra note 48, at 643-44.
94  See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Collateral,  Loan Quality, and  Bank Risk, 25 J.
MONETARY ECON.  21, 31  (1990).  Because non-bank loans are more frequently secured than
1997] 1309CORNELL LAW REVIEW
show that a substantial  amount of debt (including 70%  of the dollar
volume  of commercial bank loans)  is not secured.  Indeed, not only
are many loans unsecured, but many companies borrow on an exclu-
sively unsecured  basis.  It is well known, for example,  that large com-
panies  rarely  issue  secured  debt.95   And,  even  among  small
businesses-the  type  of firm most likely  to  rely  on secured  financ-
ing-a substantial percentage borrow exclusively on an unsecured ba-
sis:  almost  50%  of small businesses  that borrow from banks  do not
provide  collateral for their loans.96  Almost 40%  of small companies
do not rely on any secured  credit financing.97
The failure  of many loan transactions to incorporate  security in-
terests provides  evidence  that the use  of security  interests can  entail
significant  costs.  As we  saw in Section  B above, the use of a security
interest  allows  a  borrower  to  transfer  bankruptcy  value  from
nonadjusting creditors.  Thus, the failure to use a security interest im-
plies  that the  efficiency  costs of the security  interest that would  be
borne  by  the  borrower  and  the  potentially  secured  creditor  are
greater  than the  efficiency  benefits that they would  enjoy from  the
security interest plus the expected  transfer of bankruptcy value made
possible by the current priority regime.98  This, in turn, suggests that
the use of a security interest in these cases would be inefficient.
bank loans, the percentage of the total dollar volume of business lending that is secured is
even higher.  SeeJohn D. Leeth  & Jonathan A.  Scott, The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence
from the Small Business Community, 24J. FIN.  & QUANTITATIVE  ANALYsIs  379, 379  (1989)  (cit-
ing studies from  the early 1980s suggesting that nearly 80% of dollar volume  of business
loans was secured).
95  SeeJames R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring  Hypothesis, 31
J.  FIN.  ECON.  25, 40 n.10  (1992)  (reporting that firms with public debt rarely borrow on a
secured basis).
96  See Leeth & Scott, supra note 94, at 387.
97  See Trends Tracked in Banking  Practices of Small Businesses,  J. Accr.,  Oct.  1987, at 36,
39.
98  Although the current system is one of de facto partial priority, see supra  Part I.D, it
still permits a borrower to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors by issuing a security
interest.  Of course, the expected value of this transfer will be low if there is little likelihood
that the borrower will  default.  Thus,  one might suggest that the borrowers  from which
sophisticated lenders do not take security interests are those that are unlikely to fail.  How-
ever, the widespread use of negative  pledge covenants,  see infra Part II.C.2, indicates that
sophisticated  creditors  believe that,  even with  respect to firms  that borrow  mostly on an
unsecured  basis, the risk of failure is  sufficiently high  to make it worth negotiating for a
provision  that ensures  that their claims will not be subordinated  in bankruptcy.  Because
the use of these provisions indicates creditors'  concerns with their standing in bankruptcy,
it stands to reason  that these creditors would place at least some value on the bankruptcy
priority accorded by a security interest.  Thus the failure of a sophisticated creditor to use a
security interest in any given case suggests that the efficiency cost of using a security inter-
est might have been substantial.  It is also worth noting that small firms, which have a much
higher failure rate  than larger firms, frequently borrow exclusively on an unsecured basis.
See supra note 97 and  accompanying text.
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However, the failure of a lender to incorporate a security interest
into its loan arrangement with a borrower does not prove that a secur-
ity interest would have been value-wasting.  The creation of a security
interest, even under full priority, can, in principle, make nonadjusting
creditors  better  off-meaning  that  the  borrower  and  the  secured
lender  do  not capture  all  of the  benefit.99  Thus,  a borrower  and
lender contemplating the use of a value-increasing security interest in
their loan arrangement will choose not to incorporate the security in-
terest into the loan arrangement if their share  of the benefits  is less
than the costs they must bear.1 00
2.  Negative Pledge Covenants
The widespread use  of negative  pledge covenants-provisions  in
loan agreements  that severely  restrict the borrower's  ability to incur
secured debt-provides evidence that the  creation of a security inter-
est can often  make unsecured creditors worse  off.  Unsecured credi-
tors would not seek these provisions if these provisions did not make
them better off.  These provisions would not make unsecured lenders
better off unless the creation  of the security interests prohibited by
the provisions would make them worse  off.
The fact that borrowers  agree to these provisions  provides addi-
tional information.  Negative  pledge  covenants  impose  a substantial
cost on borrowers by preventing borrowers from collateralizing future
loans.  The fact that a borrower agrees  to such a covenant thus indi-
cates-  not only that the creation of a security interest prohibited by the
covenant would make the lender worse  off, but also' that the creation
of the security interest would hurt the lender more than it would help
the borrower.  In other words, the provision increases  the size of the
pie that the  two parties can share.
If the lender and the borrower were the only parties affected by
the arrangement,  the existence  of a negative  pledge covenant would
99  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 919-20; supra note 87 and accompanying  text.
100  The fact that a borrower and a creditor contemplating taking a security interest in
the borrower's property  may choose to forego using a value-creating  security  interest be-
cause they do not capture a sufficient portion of the efficiency benefits raises an interesting
point: full priority may reduce  the insufficient use of value-creating security interests.  Sup-
pose that under partial priority, a borrower and a creditor do not find it worthwhile to use
a value-creating  security interest because  the portion of the  efficiency benefits  they cap-
ture, plus the expected  transfer of bankruptcy value under partial priority, is less than the
portion of the efficiency  costs that they bear.  And suppose  that under full  priority, the
borrower and the creditor would find it worthwhile to use that security interest because the
portion  of the efficiency  benefit they capture,  plus  the expected  transfer of bankruptcy
value under full priority, is greater than the portion of the efficiency costs that they bear.
In that case, full priority would confer an  efficiency benefit by encouraging  the use of a
value-creating  security  interest  that a borrower  and a creditor would not otherwise  use.
However, the failure of advocates of full priority to make this argument may indicate that
this benefit is likely to be insignificant.
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suggest that the covenant is efficient, and therefore, that the creation
of the security interests prohibited by it would be inefficient. 1 0 1  How-
ever, the two  parties do not capture  all of the net benefit  created by
the provision,  as some  of that net benefit flows  to nonadjusting un-
secured creditors.  For example,  the provision  ensures that the loans
of the borrower's other unsecured creditors are not subordinated dur-
ing the term of the negative  pledge  lender's loan.  Therefore,  such
restrictions  mean that the negative  pledge  lender's  share of the  net
benefits derived from not creating the security interest is greater than
the entire cost borne by the borrower.  In other words, the provision is
so  efficient  (or, equivalently,  the creation  of the  prohibited security
interests would  be  so  inefficient)  that  even  though  the  negotiating
creditor cannot capture  all of the benefits from the provision, the two
parties  still find  it worthwhile  to  include  the  provision  in  the  loan
agreement.
Of course, the fact that negative pledge clauses, when value-creat-
ing, confer  a benefit on  other creditors  means  that there  are  many
times when they are not used by unsecured lenders even though  they
would be efficient.10 2  There are also many times that negative pledge
clauses  are not used because  the lender takes a less  efficient security
interest that is  more  privately beneficial  to  the  borrower because  of
the resulting  transfer of value.103  Thus,  the widespread use of nega-
tive pledge clauses understates the extent to which the creation of the
security  interests they prohibit would be inefficient.
1 0 4
101  Alan  Schwartz is correct  to point out that the existence of a negative  pledge cove-
nant does not prove that "'it would be inefficient to create ...  security interests [that would
be]  prohibited  by its terms.'"  Schwartz,  supra  note 75, at 1417 n.62  (quoting Bebchuk &
Fried, supra note 7, at 923).  Like any covenant, the negative pledge covenant can be over-
broad.  Our claim is therefore  that, at the time  the covenant is written,  the parties believe
that there  is a net efficiency  gain to prohibiting  a broad range  of security interests  (even
though some of those security interests might add value to a future  transaction, or permit
an  efficient transaction  to go forward).  However,  Schwartz  is incorrect to argue  that the
willingness of a negative  pledge creditor to waive the restriction  (in exchange for a higher
interest  rate,  a security  interest,  or some  other  compensation)  proves  that  the secured
transaction  thereby agreed to is  efficient.  One cannot draw  the inference that a security
interest created  as the result of a waiver  is efficient  because the other parties affected do
not receive the same compensation as the negative pledge creditor, and thus may be made
worse off by the secured transaction.  If the waiver and resulting secured transaction make
the lender and the borrower better off, but make other (uncompensated)  creditors worse
off by  a greater amount, then the secured transaction  would be inefficient.
102  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 889; supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
103  For another reason why lenders would not use negative  pledge clauses even when
such  a clause  is  efficient,  see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,  at  888-89  (explaining  that
lenders  may  not use negative  pledge  covenants where  the  debtor's  future borrowing  is
difficult to monitor, where the benefits may not flow to  the creditor, and where a negative
pledge covenant would be overbroad).
104  To be sure,  the widespread use of negative  pledge covenants in the United States
takes  place under the current system of de facto  partial priority.  As we explained  in  The
Uneasy  Case, certain  efficiency  benefits  of security  interests  are  "priority-dependent."
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D.  Who Is Hurt by the Use of Security Interests Under Full
Priority?
In  Section  A,  we  explained  that  there  are  four  classes  of
nonadjusting  creditors that cannot  or do  not adjust the size  of their
claims  against the  borrower  to  take into account  the  borrower's  ar-
rangements with  other creditors, including  the use of security inter-
ests  that, under full priority, would have  the effect  of reducing  the
expected value of these nonadjusting creditors' bankruptcy claims.  In
Section  B,  we  explained  why the  existence  of these  creditors  could
cause a borrower to incorporate a security interest into a loan arrange-
ment even  though  the security interest  would not add value  to  the
arrangement.  In Section  C,  we  presented  evidence  that the use  of
security interests  would, in fact,  often be value-wasting.  In this  Sec-
tion, we  identify the  parties  that ultimately bear the  efficiency  costs
associated with the creation  of value-wasting security interests.  As ex-
plained  below,  the  cost is  spread  among  many different parties,  in-
cluding borrowers.
Perhaps the easiest way to identify the parties hurt by the creation
of value-wasting security interests  is  first to  identify the  two  types  of
parties that, in aggregate, are not hurt.  The  two  groups that do not
bear the efficiency cost associated with the use of value-wasting secur-
ity interests are (1) adjusting creditors and  (2)  nonadjusting creditors,
including trade suppliers, commercial lenders, and others, that set an
interest rate  that, on average,  compensates  them for the risk of loss
they face  in extending  credit.  Every  other party affected  is hurt, in
one way or another, by the creation of value-wasting security interests.
Consider  first  involuntary  nonadjusting  creditors  such  as  tort
creditors.  Unlike  other  groups  that might,  in  theory,  be  able  to
charge  a price that compensates  them for the increased  risk of loss
due to the use of a value-wasting security interest, involuntary  credi-
tors cannot.  These nonadjusting creditors thus bear part of the costs
arising from the use of value-wasting security interests.1 0 5  Certain vol-
untary nonadjusting  creditors  that do  not always  deal with  the bor-
rower  on  terms  that reflect  their  expected  risk of loss  due  to  the
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,  at 914-21.  That is,  these benefits arise only to  the extent
secured claims are accorded priority in bankruptcy.  See id. Because  these efficiency bene-
fits would be greater under a true full-priority regime,  one might argue  that the existing
behavior of sophisticated creditors and their borrowers fails  to demonstrate that the use of
security interests would often be inefficient under a true full-priority regime.  However, we
also explained in Te Uneasy Case and in this Article as well that there are significant ineffi-
ciencies that arise when secured claims are accorded full priority in bankruptcy.  Bebchuk
& Fried,  supra note 7, at 918-21;  infra Part III.  Under a true full-priority  regime,  these
inefficiencies would be greater than they currently are.  Thus, there might even be more
use of negative pledge covenants  under a full-priority  regime.
105  Of course, these creditors will also bear some of the costs associated with the other
inefficiencies  arising out of full priority.  See infra Part III.
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borrower's use of a value-wasting security interest and that cannot di-
versify the  risk  (for example,  the borrower's  employees  and custom-
ers)  might also bear part of the cost.
Next, consider borrowers  as a class.  To the extent that adjusting
and sophisticated nonadjusting creditors  charge-higher interest rates
to reflect the risk of loss due to the creation  of value-wasting security
interests,  borrowers'  profits  are  reduced.  Note  that  sophisticated
nonadjusting  creditors  will charge  a higher interest rate  to  any bor-
rower that could potentially create value-wasting security interests sub-
ordinating their claims.  If in the end, all borrowers  do create  value-
wasting security interests, then each borrower will ultimately bear the
cost, through higher interest rates,  that would  otherwise be imposed
on  adjusting  and sophisticated  nonadjusting  creditors.  However,  if
some  borrowers  create  security  interests  and  others  do  not,  and
nonadjusting  creditors  are  unable  to distinguish  between  these  two
types of borrowers, then both types of borrowers will pay higher inter-
est rates for unsecured credit even though one type will  create value-
wasting  security  interests  and  the  other  will  not.  In  essence,  the
higher interest rates  paid by borrowers  that do not create value-wast-
ing security interests  will  subsidize  the use  of value-wasting  security
interests by other borrowers. 1 0 6  This cross-subsidization  effect means
that borrowers creating security interests do not necessarily internalize
the full cost of the security interests that they create.
III
ON THE  OTHER EmCIENCY  COSTS  OF FuLL PRiOR=rY
In Part II, we examined one efficiency cost of full priority: in loan
transactions  that would go  through whether or not the parties use a
security interest, full priority may cause the borrower to create a secur-
ity interest even though it does not add value to the transaction.  This
Part further  develops  and defends  our  claim  that full priority  pro-
duces at least three other efficiency costs:  (1)  in a loan transaction  in
which  the parties will use a security interest whether or not secured
claims receive full priority in bankruptcy, according full priority to se-
cured claims  may undesirably reduce the secured  creditor's monitor-
ing of the borrower;  (2)  the possibility of borrowing later on a secured
basis under full priority may cause a borrower to make inefficient de-
cisions  with  respect  to  potential  tort liability;  and  (3)  when  a  loan
transaction  will not go through  unless the lender is  given  a security
106  For a simple example of this cross-subsidization  effect, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra
note  7, at 887.
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interest providing it with full priority in the underlying collateral, full
priority may permit the financing of undesirable activities. 0 7
A.  Reduced Monitoring by Secured Lenders Under Full Priority
A potentially large efficiency cost of according full priority to se-
cured  claims is that full priority reduces  the incentive  of the secured
creditor  to  "monitor" the  debtor,  that  is,  attempt  to  prevent  the
debtor from engaging in value-wasting activities, known as "misbehav-
ior.'u0 8  The intuition here is simple:  to  the extent that the secured
creditor is insulated from risk of loss because it has full priority in the
collateral subject to the security interest, it has less incentive  to moni-
tor the borrower for misbehavior.  Full  priority is likely to  have  two
distinct effects on a secured  creditor's  incentive  to monitor the  bor-
rower:  (1)  full priority will reduce  the secured creditor's incentive  to
incorporate  into the  loan agreement  additional  covenants  aimed  at
preventing  the borrower  from  engaging in  certain  types  of undesir-
able behavior and (2)  even if full priority does not reduce the secured
creditor's incentive to incorporate  additional covenants  into the loan
agreement, it will reduce  the secured  creditor's incentive  to attempt
to enforce the covenants  it has incorporated into the loan agreement,
as  well  as  whatever  creditor  rights  state  debtor-creditor  law
provides. 0 9
107  Our analysis below of these three costs  draws on, and further develops, material in
Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7.  There are other possible costs of full priority which we did
not examine in The Uneasy Case and which we will not consider here, including the possible
detrimental effect of full priority on the ability of firms to reorganize  themselves in Chap-
ter 11.
108  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 897-903.  One commentator, asserting that in
The Uneasy Case we use the term "misbehavior" to describe conduct by a borrower that does
not further the interests of the lender, argues  that such a characterization  is "erroneous
because it ignores the fact that the borrower is just as independent an economic actor, and
therefore just as entitled to pursue  its own interests, as the lender."  Mann, Explaining the
Pattern, supra note 48, at 649  n.89.  In The Uneasy Case, we indicated  that we use the term
.misbehavior"  to mean "inefficient behavior."  Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 872.  The
use of the term misbehavior is not meant to imply that inefficient behavior by the borrower
is  necessarily  illegal,  immoral,  or othenvise  blameworthy.  And an  efficient  activity  that
runs counter to the interest of the lender would not be considered misbehavior, even if the
activity would violate the loan agreement.  (To the extent the borrower is unable to engage
in an  efficient  activity  because of the loan agreement, we would consider  that result  an
.opportunity  cost" of the loan  arrangement.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text.)
109  For a discussion  of how lenders monitor borrowers' behavior  through various fea-
tures of their loan agreements, see Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Col-
lateral As Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN.  1113  (1995).  There are  a number of theories
addressing how full priority could assist the monitoring of a borrower. We reviewed these
theories in  The Uneasy Cas4 and explained why we believe that full priority is unlikely to
offer significant monitoring  benefits.  Bebchuk  & Fried, supra  note 7, at 913-17.  During
the Symposium, no one expressed support for full priority on these grounds, so we will not
restate  these  theories and our analysis of them here.
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1.  Reduced Use of Covenants
When a borrower and a creditor have adopted a security interest,
full priority makes  it less  likely that the  two will  include in their ar-
rangement  a set of covenants  that would  be efficient.  This problem
may arise  even if the security interest giving the creditor full priority
adds value  to  the  arrangement.  The  point is  that the  arrangement
would add  even more value if it also  included the covenants  that, as  a
result of full priority, the arrangement does not incorporate.
In a perfect world in which the terms of other creditors'  arrange-
ments fully reflect the consequences  to them of all of the elements of
the arrangements  into which the  borrower enters, a borrower and a
creditor would have  an incentive  to  adopt any covenant  that is  effi-
cient because  they would capture  all of the resulting benefits.  In our
world, however, nonadjusting creditors would capture part of the ben-
efits and bear none of the costs of any covenants which  the creditor
and the  borrower  negotiate.  Consequently,  even  if the set of cove-
nants were  efficient, it would not be privately beneficial for the bor-
rower and creditor to adopt the covenants if the cost to the borrower
outweighs the benefits accruing to the creditor (and any other adjust-
ing creditors).
Although  this  problem-that a borrower  and creditor will  have
an  insufficient  incentive  to  adopt  efficient  covenants-is  generally
true whenever there are creditors whose claims do not fully reflect the
agreement between the borrower and creditor, the problem becomes
even more severe if the two parties adopt a security interest under the
rule  of full priority.  In such a case, the  creditor's risk of loss will be
reduced and, therefore, the benefit to the creditor of an additional set
of covenants  will be  even  smaller.110  The  creditor  is  thus  even  less
likely under a rule  of full priority to adopt a covenant that is highly
efficient.1"
110  If the creditor's loan is fully secured, and there is sufficient excess collateral to fully
cover the creditor's  collection  costs and any unpaid interest,  then its risk of loss will  ap-
proach zero.  Cf Hudson, supra note 46, at 52 (observing that a bank with a secured loan
will have no incentive to use its knowledge of the debtor optimally because  it is  fully pro-
tected from  risk of loss).
I II  For an extended example, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 900-01.  The point
that a creditor taking security is less likely to "monitor" the debtor through other contrac-
tual restrictions  is  well understood in  the literature.  See Buckley,  supra note 5,  at 1440;
Jackson  & Kronman,  supra note 5,  at 1153;  Triantis,  supra note 5,  at 244.  For empirical
evidence that secured lenders adopt fewer covenants,  see Kenneth  Lehn & Annette Poul-
sen,  Contractual  Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, 34 J.L. &
ECON.  645,  660-68  (1991).
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2.  Reduction in  Monitoring
We have just seen that, in the presence of nonadjusting creditors,
the use of a security interest may cause a borrower and a creditor to
forego the use of desirable covenants  even if the security interest adds
value to the arrangement.  However, even if full priority has no effect
on the use of covenants  in  the arrangement,112  full priority can inef-
ficiently reduce  the  creditor's  incentive  to  enforce  its loan  contract
with the borrower.  In  particular, full priority can give the creditor less
incentive to enforce any loan contract covenants with the borrower or
to force the borrower into bankruptcy when it would be socially desir-
able for the borrower to liquidate  or reorganize. 1 3
In  discussing full priority's effect on the use of covenants in  loan
arrangements, we abstracted from the level of the creditor's  enforce-
ment efforts-the  activities  the creditor undertakes  to ascertain  that
the  borrower  is  complying with  its  contractual  commitments.  How-
ever, a borrower's incentive to comply with the covenants it has issued
may depend on the extent of the creditor's enforcement efforts.  That
is, the less the creditor monitors the borrower's compliance with these
commitments, the less likely it is to detect a breach.  Hence, it will be
more likely that the borrower will find the expected cost of breach  to
be less than the expected benefit of breach, and therefore will violate
the covenants.  To  the extent  that the  covenants  bar the borrower
from engaging  in  inefficient activities,  the  level of the creditor's  en-
forcement efforts will therefore  have efficiency implications.
Even  in the absence  of priority, the creditor will  engage in less
than the optimal amount of enforcement activity because some of the
benefit of this activity will flow to other creditors, yet it  (and the bor-
rower)  will bear all of the costs.  However, the creditor will have even
less of an incentive  to engage  in  enforcement  activities to the extent
that a security interest giving the creditor's claim full priority in bank-
ruptcy protects the creditor from risk of loss, just as it will have  less
incentive  to adopt  even  highly  efficient  covenants.  As  a  result, the
borrower may be more likely to violate a covenant and act inefficiently
under  a  rule  of full priority  if  the  creditor  has  a  security interest.
Thus, even if full priority does not lead to the adoption of fewer cove-
nants, it may well degrade the effectiveness  of the covenants  they do
adopt and lead to efficiency problems  by reducing the creditor's  in-
112  One  can imagine  a number  of cases  in which the  priority rule does not affect a
creditor's  use  of covenants.  For  example, a bank may  use the  same  standardized  loan
contract whenever it extends credit to a particular class of borrowers whether or not it also
takes a security interest.  SeeBebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 902 n.150. Another example
might be financing sellers, which may or may not take a security interest when they extend
credit, but rarely employ  covenants in either case.
113  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 902-03; Woodward,  supra  note  37, at 35-37.
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centive  to  monitor  the  borrower's  compliance  with  those
covenants.
1 1 4
Under the rule of full priority, a secured creditor that is well pro-
tected by collateral  does not have sufficient incentive to  call a default
(or cut off funding) when the borrower's owners attempt to continue
operating inefficiently in the hope of saving the business." 5  Because
in many  cases a borrower's unsecured creditors  will have neither the
information nor the sophistication  to  force the borrower into bank-
ruptcy, 116  there  will be  an  efficiency  loss  until  the secured  creditor
forces the borrower  to cease operating." 7  Thus,  even if the creditor
and borrower  did not include any covenants  in the  loan agreement
other  than a default  clause,  full priority, by tending  to  insulate  the
creditor from the effects of the borrower's collapse,  does not provide
the  creditor  with  the proper incentive  to  terminate  its  relationship
with  the borrower." 8
114  Even those who support the rule of full priority recognize the problem  that a fully
secured  creditor will suboptimally monitor the borrower.  See, e.g.,  Buckley, supra note 5, at
1440-41.  Because  all contracts between commercial borrowers and creditors  implicitly in-
corporate  the mandatory rules  that govern  the debtor and creditor relationship,  such as
fraudulent conveyance  law and corporate law limitations on payments to shareholders, this
problem  will arise  even if the  two  parties do  not choose to  adopt other  covenants.  See
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,  at 903 n.151.
115  It is widely understood that under full priority a secured  creditor with influence
over a borrower may not act optimally on the eve of bankruptcy.  See Hudson, supra  note
46, at 49; Jackson  & Scott, supra note 46, at 170-71;  White, supra  note 46, at 554-55.
116  See Elizabeth Warren,  Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.  CHI.  L. REv.  775,  794  (1987).
117  Some  commentators  have  argued  that monitoring  is  ineffective  because  the  se-
cured  creditor  will  react  to  borrower  misbehavior  by  seizing  the  collateral,  leaving  un-
secured creditors  with nothing.  See Lisa M.  Bossetti  & Mette  H. Kurth, Professor  Elizabeth
Warren's  Article 9 Carve-Out Proposal: A  Strategic  Analysis, 30 UCC LJ. 3, 20-21  (1997).  How-
ever, these commentators miss two  important points.  First, the threat of repossession de-
ters borrowers from engaging in activities that would adversely  affect unsecured creditors.
Second,  by shutting  down  a company  that is  operating inefficiently,  a secured creditor
prevents a borrower from incurring more debts to current and future unsecured creditors
(including the government, employees,  customers, and trade creditors) which it is unlikely
to be  able to repay.
118  Full priority can also give a secured creditor insufficient incentive to provide addi-
tional credit to  a borrower when avoiding bankruptcy  would be  efficient.  See Klee,  supra
note 32,  at 1472-74.  In  Tle Uneasy Case, we cited Dean Scott's empirical study of borrower-
lender relationships and an article by a senior bankruptcy judge to support our claim that
a "bank will be able to exert a significant amount of influence over the borrower.  Indeed,
a bank will frequently determine whether or not a borrower  files for bankruptcy and the
timing of any filing.  Thus, the bank is in a unique position to control a borrower's behav-
ior."  Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7, at 903  (citing Samuel L. Bufford,  Wat Is Right About
Bankruptcy  Law and Wrong About Its Critics,  72 WASH.  U. L.Q. 829, 834-35  (1994);  Scott, supra
note  5, at 925-33).  Some readers have interpreted this  to mean that we believe  the bank
"controls" the business  of the borrower.  We are not claiming that the secured lender runs
the borrower's business,  which might expose  it to lender liability.  We  are simply making
the familiar point that, by threatening to call a default (or by calling a default), a bank has
a tremendous amount of leverage  over a financially-distressed borrower.  See LoPucki, supra
note  11,  at 1492-93; Mann, Explaining  the Pattern, supra note 48, at 646-48.
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B.  Inefficient Decisions with Respect to  Potential Tort Liability
As we saw, full priority may affect a borrower's behavior following
a loan transaction if the effect of full priority is to cause the creditor to
fail to incorporate various covenants into the arrangement or enforce
those that are incorporated.  However,  the borrower's  ability to  give
the  creditor  a  security  interest  that  subordinates  the  claims  .of
nonadjusting creditors may affect the borrower's behavior even before
the creditor and the borrower negotiate their loan contract.
Consider the case where the borrower must decide, prior to con-
tracting with the creditor, whether to take certain precautions that will
make its products  safer and reduce the number of future tort claims
against  the  borrower.  The  borrower  knows  that when  the  creditor
and the borrower later negotiate their loan contract, the creditor will
take  expected  tort claims into account  in setting its interest rate.  If
the  creditor  is  unsecured,  the  creditor  will  charge  the borrower  a
higher interest rate, to the extent it anticipates that future tort claims
will reduce the value of its loan by diluting the creditor's share of the
borrower's bankruptcy assets.  By adjusting its interest rate to take into
account  the expected  number of tort  claims,  the creditor will force
the  borrower to  internalize more  of the  costs of the tort claims  that
are likely to arise if it fails to take these precautions.  If the creditor is
expected  to be  unsecured,  the  prospect of paying  a higher interest
rate to the creditor will increase the incentive for the borrower to take
the precautions in the first place.
Under the  rule of full priority, however, the borrower may give
the creditor a security interest that protects the value of the creditor's
loan from the dilutory effect of tort claims.  Consequently, if the credi-
tor is given a security interest, it may not charge a higher interest rate
even if the borrower fails to take precautions, and there are more tort
claims against the borrower.  Because  the borrower will not face the
prospect of paying  the  creditor  a higher  interest  rate  if more  tort
claims against it are likely, the borrower will have  less incentive  to in-
vest in precautions if it knows that it can grant the creditor a security
interest giving the creditor's secured  claim full priority.119
With respect to this particular efficiency cost of full priority, Har-
ris and Mooney argue that tort liability generally has little to no effect
on a borrower's  behavior.120  Therefore, the borrower's  ability to re-
duce the effect of tort liability by issuing security interests under the
rule of full priority should not, they argue, have much  effect on the
119  Both  those favoring and those critical of the rule of full priority recognize the use
of security  interests to permit the borrower  to bear less  of the  tort claims against it.  See
Buckley, supra note 5,  at 1417; LoPucki, supra note 60, at 1898.
120  Harris  & Mooney, supra note 11,  at 1361-70.
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borrower's  decisions  whether to  take  precautions  or to  refrain from
activities  likely to generate  tort claims.
We do not share the view that tort liability has little effect on firm
behavior, for there is substantial  evidence that tort liability does affect
firm behavior.  For  example, firms  invest in precautions  that reduce
their expected tort liability.  Firms would not incur such  expenses if
they were  indifferent to  their expected tort liability.
Harris and Mooney argue in the alternative that even if tort liabil-
ity  does affect firm  behavior, firms'  ability to  reduce the cost of tort
liability by issuing secured debt under a rule of full priority is likely to
have  only  a  minimal  effect  on tort liability,  and therefore,  on  firm
behavior.  Whether full priority has a small or large effect on tort lia-
bility is, of course, an empirical question to which we currently do not
have an answer. 121  Nevertheless,  it is worth  emphasizing that even if
full priority has  only a limited  effect  on expected  tort liability,  and
therefore  on firm behavior, partial  priority may still yield substantial
benefits  in terms of reducing expected  tort liability.  For example,  a
slight increase in expected tort liability might cause firms to adopt, at
little expense,  additional precautions that have a substantial effect on
the  amount of expected harm.
C.  Funding of Marginal Activities
So far, we have discussed three efficiency costs of full priority:  (1)
in loan transactions that will go through in any event, full priority may
cause a borrower  to incorporate  a security interest into the arrange-
ment even though it is value-wasting;  (2)  in loan transactions that will
use a security interest regardless of the priority rule in bankruptcy, full
priority may  undesirably  reduce  the  secured  creditor's  incentive  to
monitor the  borrower;  and  (3)  the  prospect of borrowing  on  a se-
cured basis under full priority may cause a firm to undesirably reduce
its investment in precautions or to undesirably engage in more activity
likely to give  rise to tort liability.
The fourth  efficiency  cost of full priority is  that it may facilitate
loan transactions  that enable  the borrower  to fund inefficient invest-
ments.  The  intuition  here  is  simple:  when  there  are  nonadjusting
creditors, the creation of a security interest giving a lender full priority
creates  a subsidy not only for the use of the security interest in the
arrangement, but also  for the transaction itself.  Thus,  a transaction
that would not go forward without such a subsidy might go forward
with such a subsidy.  We will defer further discussion of this efficiency
cost of full priority until Part V, where we discuss the effect of partial
121  See id. at 1370.  It  is easy, of course,  to construct a numerical example showing that
a particular rule has no effect on a firm's behavior.  See Bossetfi & Kurth, supra  note 117, at
18-19.
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priority  on  the  financing  of  value-increasing  and  value-decreasing
projects.
IV
ON THE  DESIGN  OF PARTiL-PRoiu'ry  RuLEs
We have seen that full priority can produce significant efficiency
costs.  However,  it would not be  desirable to adopt  a rule of partial
priority if either  (a) the efficiency costs of such a rule would be even
larger;  or  (b)  such  a  rule  could  not  be  effectively  implemented.
Before considering these issues  (as we do in Parts V and VI), it is nec-
essary to  explain how partial priority might be implemented.  There-
fore,  this  Part presents  and discusses  three  possible  partial-priority
rules.  We first restate the two partial-priority rules that we put forward
and analyzed in The Uneasy Case (the "fixed-fraction priority rule" and
the "adjustable-priority rule"). 122  We then introduce a third possible
rule  (the "consensual-priority rule").
The  three  partial-priority  rules  can  be  summarized  as  follows.
Under the "fixed-fraction priority rule," a fixed fraction of the collat-
eral backing secured claims would be made available to pay the claims
of unsecured  creditors.' 23  The "adjustable-priority  rule"  accords  se-
cured claims priority only over the claims of nonadjusting creditors. 124
Finally,  under  the  "consensual-priority  rule,"  secured  claims  would
have priority only over the claims of creditors that had explicitly con-
sented  to subordination.
We wish  to  emphasize  that none  of these  partial-priority  rules
would be superior in every respect to the rule of full priority.  There
would be  efficiency  costs  associated  with these  rules  or any rule  of
partial  priority.  Thus,  although  some  commentators  have  read  The
Uneasy  Case as  advocating  adoption  of a  partial-priority  rule, 25  we
tried to make clear in The Uneasy Case  and will restate here that, at this
point, we merely think that these rules should be considered with an
open mind as alternatives to full priority.
126
Before proceeding with descriptions  of these rules, we also must
emphasize  three  other points.  First, as we have  explained in The  Un-
easy Case and in this Article, the purpose of these rules is not to protect
unsecured creditors, although all of these rules might have the effect
of making certain groups of unsecured creditors, such as involuntary
creditors and unsophisticated  creditors  that do not set their interest
122  Bebchuk &'Fried, supra note 7, at 904-11.
123  See id. at 909-11.
124  See id. at 905-09.
125  See, e.g., LoPucki, supra  note 11, at 1495; Mann, Explaining  the Pattern,  supra  note 48,
at 683 n.228.
126  Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 904, 934.
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rate to reflect the risk of loss from the borrower's failure and the sub-
ordination  of their  claims  (e.g.,  customers  and  employees),  better
off.
127  The  purpose  of these  rules  is  to  reduce  the  efficiency  costs
associated with full priority.
128
Second,  although  some  commentators  have  characterized  the
two  rules  we  put  forward  in  The  Uneasy  Case as  "a  subordination
scheme,"' 2 9  none  of these rules  subordinates  the claims  of secured
creditors  to  those of unsecured  creditors:  under all three of the rules,
secured creditors' claims would receive at least as much as unsecured creditors'
claims.  Indeed, neither of the  two rules we considered  in  The Uneasy
Case would  completely  eliminate  the  priority  accorded  to  secured
claims in bankruptcy.  Rather, these partial-priority rules would affect
only the  degree  to  which  the secured  creditor  enjoys  priority  in its
collateral  over  unsecured  creditors  when  the  debtor  enters  bank-
ruptcy.1 30  Furthermore, under all three of the partial-priority rules we
consider, a secured creditor would continue to enjoy full priority in its
collateral over the claims of subsequent secured creditors, transferees,
nonordinary-course  purchasers,  and  unsecured  creditors  that  had
consented  to  subordination.131  Finally, none  of these priority rules
would have any effect on the secured creditor's rights outside of bank-
ruptcy. That is, none of the rules would require modifying Article 9 of
the UCC or the state laws  governing transactions in real property. 32
Third, there is no need to apply the same partial-priority rule in
every context.  Some Symposium  participants  expressed the concern
that imposing a partial-priority  rule in certain contexts  (for example,
securities  loans  among  financial  institutions)  would  produce  little
benefit  and  give  rise  to potentially  large  costs.  To  the  extent that
there are particular transactions that should not be subject to partial
priority,  they could  be  exempted.'3 3  In  general,  secured  creditors
could be given different degrees of priority in their collateral depend-
127  Id. at 904.
128  In a world without priority but with nonadjusting creditors, the problems that we
identify would continue to arise, albeit to a lesser degree.  See Baird, supra  note 45, at 1427-
29.
129  Harris & Mooney,  supra note 11, at  1364.
130  Under the third rule, a secured creditor would not enjoy any priority over the claim
of an unsecured creditor that had not explicitly consented to subordination.  Instead, the
secured  creditor and the unsecured  creditor would both share pro rata in the collateral.
See infra Part IV.C.
131  Thus, any of the rules would be  compatible with any system of priority among se-
cured claims.
132  Therefore, the adoption of any of the rules would not affect the priority-independ-
ent efficiency benefits connected with security interests.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7,
at 875-76.
133  See Klee,  supra  note 32, at 1477-78.
[Vol. 82:1279 1322THE UNEASY CASE: FURTHER THOUGHTS
ing on the type of collateral, the size of the loan, and the type of the
lender or borrower.
8 4
A.  The Fixed-Fraction  Priority Rule
Under the fixed-fraction  priority rule, a secured  creditor would
receive full priority with respect to a certain percentage  of its secured
claim.  The  collateral  backing the  rest  of the claim would be  made
available  to  pay unsecured  claims  (including that portion of the  se-
cured creditor's secured claim that was made unsecured by operation
of the rule).  Thus, under a rule giving secured creditors 75%  of their
secured claim, the other 25% of the collateral would be distributed to
pay unsecured claims-including  the unsecured claims of all secured
creditors.1 3 5  The  fixed-fraction  priority  rule  would  always  leave  se-
cured creditors partially unsecured, even if the value of the collateral
exceeds the amount owed to them. 3 6
To  illustrate  the operation  of the fixed-fraction  priority rule, we
will consider the version in which the secured creditor receives prior-
ity with  respect  to  75%  of its secured  claim.  Assume  that when  the
borrower goes bankrupt, it has $1.2  million in assets and owes $1 mil-
lion to each of three creditors: the secured creditor, an adjusting cred-
itor, and a nonadjusting creditor.  Assume  that the secured  creditor
has a security interest with respect to all $1.2 million of the borrower's
assets.  Its secured claim-which is the lesser of the amount owed and
the value  of the collateral-would  thus be $1 million.  Under a 75%
fixed-fraction  priority rule, the secured creditor receives  $750,000  of
the encumbered assets.  The remainder of its claim, $250,000,  is made
unsecured  and pooled  with  those  of the  other  two  creditors.  The
134  We  agree  with those  who  argue  that in designing a bankruptcy system  attention
must be paid  to underlying  commercial  practices.  See,  e.g.,  Mann,  supra note  11,  at 48.
However, commercial practices  evolve rapidly and are in part shaped by the rules used to
govern  them.  Thus it would be fruitless and perhaps counterproductive  to try to fashion a
different priority rule for each  commercial context.
135  In  1985,  the German  Commission on Bankruptcy  Law proposed  a variant  of the
fixed-fraction  priority rule as a replacement  for the rule of full priority in German bank-
ruptcy law.  See Drukarczyk, supra note 5, at 205 & n.8.  The proposal  recommended that
secured creditors receive only 75% of the amount of their secured claims collateralized  by
personal property on the grounds that personal property liens in Germany are difficult to
discover, and that, as we have argued, exposing secured creditors to increased risk of loss is
likely to encourage more desirable monitoring of their borrowers.  See id. at 205.  Although
this proposal was never adopted,  the new German Insolvency Law, adopted in 1994, incor-
porates several  new administrative  fees that have  the effect of reducing  the  payment to
secured  claims  in  bankruptcy  by  9%  of the  value  of personal  property  collateral.  See
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7,  at 909-10;  Klee, supra note 32,  at 1477-78.
136  Contrary to  the  claims of some  commentators,  the  fixed-fraction  rule would not
"limit[ ] security interests to a percentage  of a borrower's  collateral."  Bossetti & Kurth,
supra  note 117, at 4.  Under the 75%  fixed-fraction rule, a borrower could encumber all of
its collateral.  However, in bankruptcy, at least 25%  of the encumbered collateral would be
made available  to pay  the claims of unsecured  creditors.
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$450,000 in assets available to pay unsecured claims is then distributed
to the  three creditors in proportion to their unsecured claims so that
the  $2.25  million  in  unsecured  claims  ($2  million in  claims  by the
adjusting and nonadjusting creditors and $0.25 million of the secured
creditor's secured claim which is rendered unsecured by operation of
the rule)  are paid 20 cents on the dollar.  Thus, the secured  creditor
receives  $50,000  for its unsecured  claim  and the other creditors  re-
ceive  $200,000  each.'3 7
As we explain in  The  Uneasy Case, the fixed-fraction  priority rule
would reduce the ability of creditors and their commercial borrowers
to use security interests to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors
by  not  allowing  secured  claims  to  fully  subordinate  nonadjusting
claims  in bankruptcy.8 8  The fixed-fraction  priority rule would thus
also decrease  the  excessive use  of security interests,  the distortion  in
the  monitoring  arrangements  of  commercial  borrowers  and  their
creditors, and (as we will explore in more detail below) the funding of
undesirable  business  activities.  The  reduction  of  these  distortions
would depend on the percentage  of the secured claim that is treated
as unsecured:  the larger the percentage,  the greater the reduction  in
the identified efficiency  costs.  In the  extreme  case where the entire
secured claim is  treated as unsecured, the parties could not use a se-
curity interest to  transfer value in bankruptcy, and the inefficiencies
that full priority causes would  be completely eliminated.139
137  One person has suggested to us that the rule "double-compensates" adjusting credi-
tors by  giving them  some  of the secured  creditors'  collateral  even though  they had ad-
justed to the security interest by charging a higher interest rate.  If a creditor is adjusting,
however, it will charge a lower interest rate than it would under full priority to reflect the
fact that it will receive a larger fraction of the borrower's bankruptcy estate.  As a result, the
fixed-fraction rule does not overcompensate  adjusting creditors.
138  Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note  7, at 910.
139  See  id.  Ronald Mann has argued  that in the context of construction  finance, his
proposal to give the claims of contractors priority over the claims of (secured) construction
lenders would be  superior  to a fixed-fraction  rule which,  in  this  context, would give  se-
cured construction lenders partial priority over contractors.  Mann, supra  note 11, at 46-48.
Although  his carefully-researched  proposal  may well be worth adopting, his claim  that a
contractor-first rule gives construction lenders more incentive to control risk than a fixed-
fraction  rule  is not necessarily  correct.  Relative  to a fixed-fraction  rule, a contractor-first
rule would force construction lenders to internalize more of the costs that would otherwise
fall on contractors, giving construction  lenders more of an incentive to reduce  the risk of
loss faced by this class of creditors.  However, unlike a fixed-fraction rule, a contractor-first
rule would not force construction lenders to internalize any of the costs imposed on other
creditors, including tort creditors,  the government, and  other nonadjusting  creditors  of
the property owner, thereby giving construction lenders less incentive  to reduce the risk of
loss faced by these classes  of creditors.  Depending on the fraction of secured claims that
the fixed-fraction  rule would  treat  as  unsecured,  and  the size  of these  other creditors'
claims relative to the claims of contractors, a fixed-fraction rule might provide construction
lenders with more of an incentive to  reduce  the  risk of loss faced by other creditors.
In any event, the purpose of our rules is to reduce  the efficiency  costs that arise from
priority,  not to  solve  all of the possible  problems that can  arise in  contracting between
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B.  The Adjustable-Priority Rule
The other partial-priority rule we put forward in  The Uneasy Case
is  the adjustable-priority  rule.14 0  Under  the adjustable-priority  rule,
claims  of nonadjusting  creditors  would  not be  subordinated  to  se-
cured claims with respect to which they were nonadjusting.'  In other
words,  a nonadjusting creditor's  share of bankruptcy value would be
calculated  by  (1)  assuming  that the secured  claims  with  respect to
which the creditor was nonadjusting were  actually unsecured claims,
and  (2)  applying  the  rule  of full  priority.  The  difference  between
what the nonadjusting  creditor would receive  under the rule  of full
priority and what it receives  under the adjustable-priority rule would
come at the expense of the secured claims with respect to which it was
nonadjusting.  Adjusting creditors would receive what they would have
received under the rule  of full priority.
One might question whether a bankruptcy court could, in fact,
identify those  creditors that were nonadjusting with respect to a par-
ticular security interest in order to enforce such a rule.  In The Uneasy
Case, we address the feasibility of implementing the adjustable-priority
rule, and will not do so  again here.141  Below, we will simply assume
that the court is able to identify a debtor's  nonadjusting creditors to
show how the rule would work under ideal conditions.
Suppose  again  that a  borrower  goes  into bankruptcy  with  $1.2
million in assets and outstanding liabilities of $3  million, of which $1
million  is owed to  the secured  creditor, $1 million is owed to an ad-
justing unsecured  creditor, and $1 million is owed to a nonadjusting
creditor.  Again, assume that all $1.2  million of the assets are subject
to a security interest held by the secured creditor.
In the absence of any priority, the $1.2 million in assets would be
divided  on  a  pro  rata  basis  with  each  creditor  receiving  $400,000.
Under the rule of full priority, assuming that all unsecured creditors
share pro rata in the remaining assets, the secured creditor receives $1
million and  the remaining  $200,000  in  assets is  divided  equally  be-
tween  the other two  creditors.  The result under full priority is  that
$300,000  of bankruptcy  value  is  transferred  from  each  unsecured
creditor to the secured  creditor.  The secured creditor thus benefits
under the full-priority rule at the equal expense of both the adjusting
and the nonadjusting creditor.
borrowers and creditors.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 904 n.158.  A rule such as
Mann's that gives superpriority to a limited class of nonadjusting'creditors  (while reducing
the inefficiencies  that result from the presence of those nonadjusting creditors)  will  not
reduce  the efficiency problems arising from priority to the extent that they are caused by
the presence of involuntary creditors and other voluntary nonadjusting creditors.  See id. at
907-08.
140  Id. at 905.
141  Id. at 908-09.
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Under the adjustable-priority rule, the secured creditor's claim is
treated as unsecured for the purpose of determining the nonadjusting
creditor's share.  As a result, the nonadjusting creditor in this example
is entitled to receive $400,000.  The $300,000 difference between what
the  nonadjusting  creditor  receives  under  the  rule  of full priority-
$100,000-and  what  it  receives  under the  adjustable-priority  rule-
$400,000-comes  at the expense of the creditor's secured claim.  The
adjusting creditor would  receive  what it would have  obtained under
full priority, $100,000,  and the secured  creditor  would  thus  receive
$700,000.
Because  the  use  of the  security  interest  would  not  affect  the
nonadjusting creditor's share of bankruptcy value, the adjustable-pri-
ority rule would ensure that the security interest could not be used to
transfer bankruptcy value from nonadjusting creditors.  Thus, if such
a rule  could be fully implemented, it would eliminate  the inefficien-
cies we identified-the use of inefficient security interests, the moni-
toring distortions,  and  the  funding of undesirable  projects-to  the
extent they arise out of full priority.
It is worth emphasizing that an adjustable-priority rule is not the
same as  a rule  that would give  certain  creditors  superpriority over  se-
cured creditors'  claims.  For example, a growing number of commen-
tators  have  proposed  that tort or  other  claims  receive  superpriority
over secured claims (or certain secured claims) in bankruptcy. 42  The
goal  of these  proposals has been  to  increase  firms'  incentives  to  re-
duce harmful externalities  on third parties.  As we explained in Part
III,  the borrower's  ability to subordinate  unsecured creditors'  claims
by issuing security interests, giving the secured lender priority, enables
the borrower to internalize less of the cost it imposes on these parties
than  it would  under  a rule  of pro  rata sharing  in  bankruptcy  (or
under  the  adjustable-priority  rule).  Superpriority would  thus  force
borrowers  to internalize even more of these costs than pro rata shar-
ing, and presumably would lead borrowers to take even better precau-
tions  and  choose  even  better  projects  than  under  a pro  rata  rule.
However, superpriority for tort claimants would, at best, somewhat re-
duce, and certainly not eliminate, the efficiency problems that full pri-
ority  causes.  As  explained,  the  efficiency  costs  of  according  full
priority  to secured claims arise because of the existence of nonadjust-
ing  creditors,  most of which  are  voluntary  creditors  or government
agencies.  Thus,  giving superpriority  to  tort claims  would  immunize
tort creditors against  the effect of priority, thereby reducing  the effi-
142  For recommendations  that tort creditors  receive priority over the claims of other
creditors, see  Barry E. Adler, Financial  and  Political  Theories of  American Corporate  Bankruptcy,
45 STAN.  L. REv.  311,  340 (1993); Leebron, supra  note 63, at 1650; LoPucki, supra  note 60,
at 1907-08;  Roe,  supra  note 73, at 227; Painter, supra note 63, at 1088-81.
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ciency  costs  to  the  extent that they are  due  to  the presence  of tort
creditors.  However, such a scheme would not, unlike the adjustable-
priority rule, reduce the distortions and efficiency costs resulting from
the  presence  of contractual  nonadjusting creditors  and government
claims.
C.  A Consensual-Priority  Rule
In The Uneasy Case and this Article, we have argued that full prior-
ity is inconsistent with the general commercial  law principle  against
nonconsensual  subordination. 143  The  fixed-fraction  priority  rule
would  also  allow nonconsensual  subordination,  although  to  a lesser
degree  than full priority.  Similarly, the adjustable-priority rule-even
if it could be implemented  so  that secured creditors  receive priority
only over the claims of adjusting creditors-would  not require adjust-
ing  creditors'  explicit  consent  for subordination.  Thus,  both  rules
would  be at least somewhat  inconsistent with  the general  principle
that a borrower cannot subordinate the claims of particular creditors
without their explicit consent.
The  third  rule  we  put forward-the  consensual-priority  rule-
would  harmonize  the  priority  system  with  the  general  principle
against nonconsensual subordination  by giving a secured creditor pri-
ority in its collateral  only over the claims of creditors that had explic-
itly consented to subordination.  (The explicit consent might be with
respect to a particular security interest or all security interests which
the borrower creates.)
A borrower would be able to obtain creditors'  consent to subordi-
nation.  Thus,  such  a rule would not  prevent the  borrower and its
creditors  from  contracting  for  full priority.144  However,  a creditor
that had  not explicitly  consented  to subordination  would  receive  a
bankruptcy  share equal to that which it would have received if all  of
the creditors were unsecured  and shared pro rata in the  bankruptcy
assets.
D.  Why Not Partial Priority Outside of Bankruptcy?
The rules we describe would apply in bankruptcy.  However, it is
important to  emphasize  that we  are  not advocating,  as  others  have
suggested,145 that partial priority apply only in bankruptcy.  If partial
priority  is  superior  to  full priority, we  think that this  distributional
143  Bebchuk & Fried, supra  note 7,  at 868-70.
144  Under the other  two partial-priority rules, a borrower and its contractual creditors
could also,  by contract,  subordinate  the  claims  of particular  creditors  to  the  claims  of
others.
145  See,  e.g., LoPucki, supra note 11,  at 1488.
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principle  should apply to  any liquidation  or reorganization of an in-
solvent firm, either inside or outside of bankruptcy.
As  a practical  matter,  however, it makes  sense  to  consider  first
rules  that would apply only in bankruptcy. 46  First, it would be sim-
pler to  make  changes  to bankruptcy  laws  than it would be  to make
uniform  changes to the various  state laws that govern priority in per-
sonal property and real property.147  Second, there is no need to apply
partial priority to solvent firms  (and there may well be costs to doing
so).  A bankruptcy-only rule ensures that the rule would apply only to
firms in financial  distress.
Of course,  a  bankruptcy-only rule would not be  as effective  as a
more widely implemented rule.148  However, as we will explain below,
we think that a bankruptcy-only partial-priority rule could still be quite
effective.'
49
V
ON  THE  COST AND  AvAnABnrY  OF  FINANCING UNDER
PARTIAL  PRIORITY
Various  Symposium participants and others  have  expressed con-
cern  that a partial-priority  rule would have an adverse  effect on  the
financing of business activity.' 50  That is, partial priority might make it
more  difficult for businesses  to finance  desirable  (value-increasing)
projects.
Before  we  analyze  this  claim  in  more  detail,  three  points  are
worth noting up front. First, in a world where not all business projects
are value-increasing,  the  desirability  of a partial-priority  rule's  effect
on  firms'  ability  to  finance  their  projects  will  depend  not  only on
whether partial priority prevents  some desirable projects from going
forward,  but also  on whether it prevents  some  undesirable  projects
from  going  forward.  Specifically,  a  partial-priority  rule's  effect  on
firms'  ability to finance  their projects would be desirable  (relative  to
an alternative rule)  if the economic cost avoided when value-decreas-
ing projects  do not go forward  is greater than the  economic  benefit
lost when  desirable projects do not go forward.
Second,  the magnitude of the effect of a partial-priority  rule on
the financing of projects will depend on the degree to which the rule
continues to respect priority.  Suppose that under our current ad hoc
146  Many  others  apparently share the view  that if  partial priority is to be adopted, it
should be adopted only in bankruptcy.  See LoPucki, supra  note  11,  at 1483-84 & n.5  (citing
those advocating a bankruptcy-only approach).
147  See Klee,  supra  note 32,  at 1478;  LoPucki, supra  note  11, at 1485  n.12.
148  See LoPucki, supra note  11,  at 1503-04,  1509-10.
149  See infra Part VI.
150  See, e.g., Harris & Mooney, supra  note  11,  at 1356-64;  Klee, supra  note 32, at 1472-74;
Turner, supra note 6,  at 328-29.
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system of partial priority, secured claims are paid, on average, 90 cents
on the dollar.  If that is the  case, replacing the current system with  a
90%  fixed-fraction  priority rule is likely to  have little effect on the fi-
nancing of business activity, for better or for worse.  A partial-priority
rule of 50% would, of course, have a larger effect, and so on.
Third, even if a partial-priority rule's net effect on the financing
of projects  is  undesirable  (for example,  the  economic  cost arising
from the failure of value-increasing projects to be financed is  greater
than the economic benefit arising from the failure of value-decreasing
projects to be financed),  the overall economic effect of partial priority
may still be desirable because  partial priority will provide other bene-
fits  that could offset the negative net effect on project financing.  In
particular, a partial-priority rule might reduce  the excessive use of se-
curity interests, lead to better monitoring of firms that do  receive fi-
nancing, and  give firms  more incentive  to avoid externalizing  harms
on third parties.  Thus,  even if one believes that a particular partial-
priority rule's net effect on financing projects would be negative, one
should still be open-minded  as to whether the rule is worth adopting.
A.  Some Preliminary Points
To begin, we want to make some general points on the cost and
availability  of credit under partial priority.  Our claim  is  that, on an
aggregate  basis,  the availability  and  cost of credit need not  change
substantially under a rule of partial priority.
1.  The Availability of Secured Credit Under Partial  Priority
One argument against partial priority is that certain lenders will
not lend at any interest rate unless they have full priority in the collat-
eral that is subject to the security interest.'5'  The evidence adduced
in support of this claim is that currently there are lenders that will not
lend unless they receive a security interest.  Supporters of full priority
argue  that under partial  priority  these lenders  simply will not lend
money to borrowers  at any interest rate and, therefore,  that partial
priority will reduce the amount of credit these lenders extend.  (Pre-
sumably, those who make this argument would also claim that borrow-
ers would have no other sources of credit, so  that the total supply of
credit would be reduced. 152)
Let us assume  arguendo that currently,  certain  lenders  will  not
lend without getting a security  interest.  Even  if this  assertion  were
151  See Harris  & Mooney,  supra note 5,  at 2030-35;  Kripke,  supra note 5,  at 954-55  &
n.95.
152  There is, however, evidence to the contrary.  See Mann, Small-Business Lending,  supra
note 48, (manuscript at 12-15)  (reporting that small commercial borrowers  have alterna-
tives to secured credit).
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true, it certainly does not prove that these lenders will not lend under
a rule of partial priority.  After all, these lenders are currently operat-
ing under a system of de facto partial priority. 153  The assertion proves
only that under the current priority regime, certain lenders require a
security interest.
The question, then, is whether reducing the degree  of priority in
bankruptcy will  cause  these  lenders  to  restrict credit.  This, in  turn,
will depend on why these lenders do not lend without a security inter-
est.  For  our purposes,  there  are  two  possible  reasons why  currently
certain lenders will not lend without a security interest:  (1)  because
the  security interest  gives  the lender priority over the  claims of un-
secured  creditors in bankruptcy,  or (2)  because  the security interest
gives  the  lender  priority-independent  rights  (for example,  priority
over  the claims  of transferees  or subsequent  secured  creditors)  that
are unrelated to the lender's priority in bankruptcy over the claims of
unsecured  creditors.
Suppose that the reason that certain lenders will not lend without
a security interest is that security interests afford the lender priority in
bankruptcy  over  the  claims  of unsecured  creditors.  Currently,  se-
cured  claims  do  not get full  priority in bankruptcy. 154  Thus,  these
lenders  are  clearly willing  to lend under partial priority.  The  ques-
tion, then, is how much priority is necessary to induce these lenders to
lend?  Ninety percent?  Eighty percent?  And how much priority would
a  secured  lender  require  if  the  borrower's  owners  guarantee  the
loan?1
55
Now suppose that the reason  why  certain lenders  will not lend
without  a security  interest  is  that the security  interest  gives lenders
many other rights which are connected not to the priority accorded to
secured claims  in bankruptcy, but rather  to something  else.  For ex-
ample, it is possible that many lenders will not lend without a security
interest  because  they  have  no  other  means  of preventing  the  bor-
rower, should it be on the verge of failing, from liquidating its assets
and distributing the proceeds to related parties.  To the extent certain
lenders insist  on a security interest for this reason, a partial-priority
rule in bankruptcy will  not cause  these  lenders  to lend  any less.  In
short, we are skeptical  of the claim that if priority is further reduced,
the supply of secured credit will materially  decrease. 56
153  See supra  Part I.D.
154  See supra Part I.D.
155  A separate question-which we address infra  Parts V.B-C--is if lenders do not lend
with, say, 80%  priority, are the projects that would go unfunded generally value-increasing
projects  or value-reducing projects?
156  To support the claim that it is necessary to give secured creditors full priority over
the claims of unsecured creditors  in bankruptcy,  some  commentators point  to  evidence
that there is  inadequate  lending in third-world  countries without functional  security sys-
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2.  The Aggregate Cost of Credit Under Partial  Priority
We just explained that the adoption of a partial-priority rule need
not reduce  the aggregate  supply of secured  credit in  the economy.
Let us now consider how a partial-priority rule would affect the aggre-
gate cost of secured and unsecured  credit, assuming, for purposes of
the  analysis,  that the availability  of secured  and unsecured  credit re-
mains the same.  As we will see, a partial-priority rule could either in-
crease  or decrease  the aggregate  cost of credit in the economy.
To begin, let us assume  that partial priority has no direct effect
on borrowers  other than on the distribution  of the borrower's assets
in bankruptcy,  which,  in  turn, affects  the  cost of both  secured  and
unsecured credit.1 5 7  To the extent that a partial-priority rule reduces
the  expected value  of secured  creditors'  share of bankruptcy  value,
secured  creditors  will  charge  more under such  a rule than under a
rule of full priority.  However, voluntary unsecured creditors, in aggre-
gate, should be willing to  charge less interest under a partial-priority
rule  than  under full priority.158  In  a world where  (1)  the priority
rule's only effect is to change the distribution of assets in bankruptcy,
and (2)  all of the unsecured creditors are voluntary and set their inter-
est rates  to  reflect  their  risk of loss,  the  total cost  of credit should
remain unchanged.
Now, let us assume  (as we  have  argued is  likely to be  the  case)
that partial priority not only affects the distribution  of value in bank-
ruptcy, but also causes borrowers and their secured creditors to enter
into more  efficient  arrangements  than  under  full  priority.159  In  a
world where  partial priority  has these  two  effects  and  all unsecured
creditors set their interest rates  to reflect their  expected risk of loss,
tems.  See Harris & Mooney, supra note 11, at 1358 n.39; Turner, supra note 6, at 329.  For
two  reasons this  evidence fails  to support their claim.  First,  creditors  in these countries
might restrict their lending not because they lack priority in their collateral over the claims
of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy, but because in the absence  of a functional security
system, they cannot prevent a borrower  on the verge of failure from liquidating its  assets
and transferring the proceeds to its owners or related parties (or transferring the collateral
directly to these  parties).  We suspect that the primary reason that lenders in these coun-
tries are reluctant to lend is their inability to prevent such fraudulent transfers.  Bebchuk &
Fried, supra note 7, at 874.  Second, even if the lenders'  main concern  is not controlling
the borrower's behavior, but rather their priority position in bankruptcy, the fact that these
lenders are reluctant to lend when they have 0% priority in bankruptcy (i.e., they share pro
rata with other unsecured creditors)  does not prove that they would be reluctant to lend if
they had, say, 80% priority.  Put simply, the behavior of lenders in countries where there is
no functional system of security  can shed little light on how U.S. lenders would  behave if
security interests would give them partial priority over the claims of unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy and full priority against the claims  of all other parties.
157  Below, we will relax this assumption and examine  the case in which partial priority
causes borrowers and their lenders  to act more efficiently.
158  For evidence  that  lenders  take  priority  rules  into  account in  determining  their
lending policy, see  Klee, supra  note 32, at 1472.
159  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7, at 870-71; supra Parts III, IV.
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the total cost of credit will actually be lower than under full priority,
because  the risk of loss that unsecured and partially secured creditors
face  will be lower in a  world where  borrowers and their lenders  act
more  efficiently.
Finally, let us make  the assumptions  more  realistic by assuming
that there  are many unsecured  creditors  that are  not voluntary and,
therefore,  cannot set the interest rate to reflect their expected risk of
loss.  These creditors will not charge less interest under partial priority
than  under  full priority.  Thus,  the  reduction  in  interest  that un-
secured creditors charge will not be as great as in a world where all of
the  unsecured creditors are voluntary.  But the reduction in interest
charged  by voluntary unsecured  creditors might still be greater than
the  increase in interest charged  by secured creditors,  in which  case,
the total cost of credit will be lower under partial priority than under
full priority.  Otherwise,  the total cost of credit will be higher under
partial priority.
However, if the total cost of credit is higher under partial priority
than under full priority, it is only because involuntary creditors receive
more in bankruptcy under partial priority.  Presumably, we would pre-
fer that tort and government claims be paid more in bankruptcy, even
if this raises the  total cost of credit.  Put differently, few would argue
that we should attempt to reduce the total cost of credit by making it
more  difficult  for  tort  and  government  claims  to  be  paid  in
bankruptcy.
16 0
B.  The Financing of Value-Increasing  and Value-Decreasing
Projects
In Section A, we explained why the adoption of a partial-priority
rule need not reduce the availability of secured credit or increase the
overall  cost  of credit.  However,  the aggregate  amount and  cost of
credit  in the economy  is  not as  important as  the  uses to which the
credit  is  put.  If the  effect of the  availability  of low-cost  credit is  to
allow inefficient  projects  to go forward,  while not facilitating  the fi-
nancing of good projects, then the availability of low-cost credit would
clearly be undesirable.  We now turn to  the effect of the priority rule
on the financing of different types  of projects.
160  One who believes that tort judgments are too high may favor reducing the payout
to  tort claims in bankruptcy.  See Harris & Mooney,  supra  note  11,  at  1366-67 n.80.  How-
ever, if tort judgments are too high, the solution would not be  to distort the entire com-
mercial  lending  system, but rather  to reform  the tort system  or, perhaps, to  subordinate
tort claims in bankruptcy  to  the claims of other unsecured creditors.
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1.  The Question
Let us now move to the central question: how does partial priority
(relative  to  full  priority)  affect  firms'  ability  to  undertake  given
projects?  From the perspective of economic efficiency, we want firms
to undertake all projects  that are value-increasing  and undertake no
projects  that  are  value-decreasing.  If  borrower  F and  creditor  C1
would capture all of the benefits of a project and bear all of the costs,
the two would have an incentive to finance and pursue a project if and
only if it were value-creating.  The  problem  is  that, when  there  are
nonadjusting creditors, borrower Fand creditor  C1 will not necessarily
capture all of the benefits and bear all of the costs of a project.  Some
of the benefits and costs will accrue to nonadjusting creditors  (unless
there is further renegotiation).161  This can distort the agreement be-
tween borrower Fand creditor  C1  to finance  a particular project, as
we explain below.
2.  The Effect of Partial  Priority  on the Financing  of Value-Increasing
Projects
Let us now consider the circumstances under which partial prior-
ity would prevent the financing of value-increasing  projects  that full
priority would facilitate.  Suppose that, under a rule of partial priority,
borrower Fis considering financing a project with a loan from credi-
tor  C1.  Suppose that the project would be value-increasing, but that
borrower Fand creditor  C1 cannot capture enough of the gain under
partial priority to make it worthwhile for them to pursue the project.
Specifically, suppose that the project would generate a surplus of $100
but would confer  a positive  externality  on nonadjusting  creditors  of
$120  (and the nonadjusting creditors are unwilling to reduce the size
of their claims  in order to reduce  the size of the externality).  Thus,
the project would make borrower Fand creditor  C1 worse off by $20
even though it would produce  a net surplus of $100.
Full priority would facilitate such a project if the additional trans-
fer of expected bankruptcy value as a result of the project is at least
$20.  Suppose  that the  additional  transfer  of expected  bankruptcy
value is $30. In that case, the project would make nonadjusting credi-
tors  better  off by  only  $90,  leaving  $10  of surplus  available  to  be
shared between borrower F and creditor  C1.  As a result, the  two will
have an incentive  to pursue  the project.
161  See infra Part V.B.4. In principle, an efficient project should  always go forward be-
cause there are ways to share the gain to make all parties better off.  See Fried, supra  note 8
(manuscript at 17); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured  Financing,  82  CORNELL L. REv.
1436,  1440-41  (1997).  In the real world,  however, it is often  difficult to reach  this result.
See Fried, supra note 8  (manuscript at 7-9).
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More  generally,  full  priority  would  facilitate  the  financing  of
value-creating projects that would not go forward under partial prior-
ity whenever both of the following conditions exist:  (1) under partial
priority, the value-creating project will confer a positive externality on
nonadjusting creditors that is bigger than the surplus  it would  create
(and the parties are unable to renegotiate to reduce this externality),
and  (2)  under full priority,  the positive  externality  is  reduced  suffi-
ciently  so  that it becomes  smaller  than  the  surplus  that would  be
created.
3.  The Effect of Partial  Priority on the Financing  of Value-Decreasing
Projects
Next,  consider  the  circumstances  under  which  partial  priority
would prevent the financing of value-decreasing  projects that full pri-
ority would facilitate. 162  Suppose that, under a rule of partial priority,
borrower Fis considering financing a project with  a loan from credi-
tor C1.  Suppose that the project would be value-decreasing,  and that
borrower  F and creditor  C1  would  not transfer  enough bankruptcy
value from nonadjusting creditors to make it worthwhile for them to
pursue the project.  Specifically, suppose that the project would gener-
ate a loss of $100 and would make borrower Fand creditor  C1 worse
off by $20.
Full priority would facilitate such a project if the additional trans-
fer of expected bankruptcy value is at least $20.  Suppose that the ad-
ditional transfer of expected bankruptcy value is $30.  In that case, the
project would make nonadjusting creditors worse off by $110,  leaving
$10  available  to be shared between borrower Fand creditor  C1.  As a
result, the two will have an incentive to  pursue the project.
More  generally, full priority will  facilitate the financing  of value-
decreasing  projects that would not go forward  under partial priority
whenever both of the  following conditions  occur:  (1) under partial
priority,  the value-reducing  project  will not  transfer sufficient  value
from nonadjusting creditors to make it worthwhile, and  (2)  under full
priority, sufficient value is transferred from nonadjusting creditors  so
that it makes the project worthwhile.
4.  Assessing the Overall Effect of Partial  Priority on Financing
One cannot determine the overall effect of partial priority on the
financing of value-increasing and value-decreasing projects  on a priori
theoretical grounds.  The net effect may also depend on the extent of
the reduction in priority.  For example, on the margin, reducing pri-
162  For a discussion of why secured  lenders might find it worthwhile to fund undesir-
able activities,  see  Klee, supra note 32, at 1479-81.
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ority from 100%  to 90% may create a desirable net effect, but moving
from 90%  to 80% may create an undesirable net effect., Therefore, we
would need  evidence to make  the determination  as  to what level  of
priority yields the optimal mix of projects.
Even so, there are some general reasons to think that partial pri-
ority  is  not  as  likely  to  prevent  the  financing  of  value-increasing
projects  as  it  is  likely  to  prevent  the  financing  of value-decreasing
projects.  When  an  efficient  activity would otherwise  not take  place
under partial priority because it would confer too great a benefit on
nonadjusting creditors, those  creditors may find it in their interest to
modify their contractual rights to reduce the size of the positive exter-
nality, and permit the activity to take place.  That is, when nonadjust-
ing  creditors  would  gain  from  certain  activities  that  will  not  be
financed under partial priority because the equityholders would cap-
ture  too  little  of  the  activities'  benefit,  the  nonadjusting  creditors
might agree to reduce their claims  (by, for example, forgiving part of
their loans)  in  order  to induce  the  equityholders  to  undertake  the
project.  The  nonadjusting  creditors  will  be better  off receiving full
payment on their reduced  claims than receiving little or no payment
on their full claims.  Indeed, lenders in workouts  commonly agree to
reduce  the  size  of their claims,  presumably  in order to increase  the
likelihood of eventually receiving payment on the remainder of their
claims.'
63
C.  The Effect of Partial Priority on the Financing of Post-
Bankruptcy  Projects
A partial-priority rule will affect not only the financing of projects
outside of bankruptcy,  but also  the financing  of projects in  Chapter
11.  Dean Baird has suggested two ways in which a partial-priority rule
may have detrimental  effects in bankruptcy. 64
The first is that partial priority would simply provide more money
for lawyers  to spend on reorganization  and would therefore waste re-
sources that would otherwise be allocated to more productive uses.' 65
To begin,  it is  not clear  that providing more resources  for funding
reorganizations  would be undesirable.  It is  possible,  as  Dean  Baird
recognizes, 66 that there are currently insufficient assets to finance the
reorganization  of businesses  that should continue  to  operate.  How-
ever, assuming  arguendo that a partial-priority rule would, in the con-
163  See Stuart C. Gilson et al.,  Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical  Study of Private
Reorganization of Firms in Default  27J. FIN. EcoN.  315,  318, 322  (1990).
164  Baird, supra  note 45, at 1433-34.
165  See  id.; see also Bossetti & Kurth, supra note  117, at 28 (noting that proposed revi-
sions expanding  Article  9  will  reduce  the  assets  available  to  administer  the bankruptcy
estate).
166  Baird,  supra  note 45, at 1434.
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text  of the  current bankruptcy  system,  lead to  wasteful  attempts  at
reorganization,  one could simply modify  bankruptcy rules  to  ensure
that the value  transferred from secured  creditors  is not used to  pay
administrative  expenses.  For  example,  value  could  be  transferred
from secured to  unsecured creditors  (according  to the fixed-fraction
or  any  other  partial-priority  rule)  only  at  the  very  end  of  the
proceeding.
Dean Baird also argues that partial priority may make it more dif-
ficult to  create  the financial  structure  of the emerging company be-
cause some parties will prefer full priority.167  However, this argument
is simply the bankruptcy  analogue  to  the  argument discussed above,
that full priority is necessary  to  obtain desirable financing  outside  of
bankruptcy.  If partial priority yields a better mix of projects outside of
bankruptcy, then it should also yield a better mix of projects in com-
panies emerging from bankruptcy.  Of course, if Dean Baird is right
that full priority is necessary to achieve the optimal mix of projects in
firms coming out of bankruptcy, then this  should be true outside  of
bankruptcy as well.
VI
ON THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF PARTIAL  PRIORIY
This  Part addresses  the  circumvention  objection  that  has been
raised  against our partial-priority  rules-that borrowers and creditors
could easily avoid the effect of partial priority in bankruptcy.  Two cir-
cumvention strategies have been considered.  The first is that, regard-
less of how partial priority is implemented, creditors  could structure
their transactions in a way that would be economically equivalent  or
similar to a secured loan, but formally would not fall under the partial-
priority rule.1 68  The second is that secured creditors seizing their col-
lateral outside of, or prior to, the debtor's bankruptcy  filing can  cir-
cumvent  a  partial-priority  rule  implemented  only in  bankruptcy.
169
The analysis  of this Part suggests that neither one of these circumven-
tion strategies  is likely to  materially undermine  the effectiveness  of a
partial-priority  rule  in bankruptcy.  Before  elaborating  however,  it is
worth pointing out that there is a tension between  the argument that
creditors can easily circumvent a rule of partial priority and the argu-
ment that a rule  of partial  priority would  substantially reduce  the fi-
nancing  of value-increasing  projects.
167  Id.
168  See, e.g., Turner, supra note 6, at 331; White,  Efficieny, supra note 5,  at 502-08.
169  See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note  11,  at 1493-94.
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A.  A Preliminary Note:  The Tension Between the Circumvention
and Credit Availability Objections  to Partial Priority
If one believes that borrowers and creditors can easily circumvent
a rule of partial priority, then one cannot simultaneously argue  that
adoption of such a rule would substantially  reduce the  availability of
financing for good projects.  (Of course, if one believes that a creditor
could  circumvent a formal partial-priority  rule, but only at some  ex-
pense, one could object to such a rule on the ground that such a rule
might produce undesirable transaction costs.)  Likewise, those who ar-
gue that a partial-priority  rule  would reduce  the financing  available
for good projects are implicitly assuming that creditors could not eas-
ily circumvent such a rule.
B.  Circumvention  Through Alternative  Forms of Financing
1.  The Severity of the General  Problem
As  Symposium  participants  and  others  have pointed  out, there
are many arrangements that accomplish a result similar to a secured
loan but which would receive more favorable treatment in bankruptcy
under a partial-priority rule. 7 0  Borrowers and creditors facing a rule
of partial priority may seek to avoid  its effects by using such arrange-
ments.  Although there are many ways to accomplish a result similar to
a secured  loan, all of the  arrangements  have  one thing in  common:
they put ownership of the  assets that would have served as  collateral
for a secured loan in the hands of another (perhaps related)  party, in
an  attempt  to  make  those  assets  unavailable  to  the  borrower's  un-
secured creditors in bankruptcy.
In  our view,  the problem  of circumvention  through the use  of
economically similar but legally'different arrangements would not be
as severe as  others believe.  Application  of the partial-priority rule to
arrangements  similar to secured  loans, but that would otherwise  re-
main outside  its  reach,  could  substantially reduce  circumvention.' 71
In general, courts pay attention to substance over form.  For example,
if the  parties characterize  an arrangement as  a lease, but it is in fact
economically  equivalent  to a  secured  loan,  a bankruptcy  court  will
treat it as a secured loan.
Thus, two  parties that would otherwise have used a secured loan
could avoid a partial-priority rule only by using an arrangement that is
substantially  different  from  a  secured  loan in  an  economic  sense.
However, using an economically different arrangement will often im-
pose costs on the parties that a secured loan would not impose.  Par-
ties  would  bear  these  costs  whether  or  not  either  party  enters
170  See, e.g., Baird, supra note 45,  at 1423-24;  Klee,  supra note 32, at 1474-75.
171  For further support for this view, see Klee, supra  note 32, at 1474-75.
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bankruptcy.  In contrast, a partial-priority rule would impose costs on
the parties  only if one  of the  parties  enters  bankruptcy.  Thus, the
expected cost of partial priority would have to be quite high  (or the
cost of substituting an alternative arrangement would have to be quite
low) for the use  of alternatives to secured loans to be worthwhile.
We  now turn  to  briefly  examine  specific  types  of alternative  fi-
nancing  arrangements:  (1)  the  use  of  leases  rather  than  secured
loans;  (2)  the use of subsidiary financing; and  (3)  the use of "special
purpose" or "bankruptcy-remote" vehicles  to isolate liquid assets (typi-
cally receivables)  from creditors in bankruptcy.
2.  The Use of Lease Arrangements
Under a rule of partial priority, secured creditors might consider
using  leases.  Leases  can  be  functionally  similar  to  secured  loans,
although  bankruptcy  courts will generally not treat them as  secured
loans.172  Under  current  bankruptcy  law,  leased  assets  are  not  the
debtor's  property  and,  therefore,  do  not  enter  the  bankruptcy  es-
tate.173  As a result, their value is not available for distribution to credi-
tors.  Instead, the bankrupt firm must either cure any existing defaults
and then  either assume  the  lease  (or assign  it to another  party)  or
reject the lease and return the assets to the lessor.' 74  As a result, the
lessor  is  assured  of receiving  either the  assets  or  the  contracted-for
payments after the lessee enters bankruptcy.  If a rule of partial prior-
ity were in effect, a secured  creditor would receive  only a portion  of
the  value  of the  assets serving  as  collateral for its loan.  Thus, firms
and their sophisticated creditors would have an incentive to structure
secured  transactions  as  leases  to  avoid  the  effect of a rule  of partial
priority.  But, as we explained, current law makes it somewhat difficult
for an arrangement that is like a secured loan to be treated as a lease
in bankruptcy.  That  is,  even  if the  parties label  an  arrangement  a
"lease," a bankruptcy  court may consider it a secured loan for bank-
ruptcy purposes. 175  There  must be  a real  economic  difference  be-
tween the lease arrangement and a secured loan for bankruptcy law to
recognize  the arrangement  as  a lease.' 76  For a bankruptcy  court to
172  See, e.g., White, Efficiency, supra  note 5, at 504. In a sale-leaseback transaction, a firm
sells  assets  to  another  party which  then  leases  them  back.  A standard  lease  agreement
requires the firm to make periodic payments on the lease to the lessor, and gives the lessor
the right to repossess the assets in the event of the firm's default.  At the termination of the
typical lease,  the lessee may either return the assets or purchase  them.  Depending  on its
terms, the lease may very closely resemble  a secured transaction.  In both cases,  the firm
has use of an asset, agrees to make a stream of payments to another party, and must relin-
quish possession  of the asset if it fails to make  these payments.
173  See 11  U.S.C. § 541(b) (2)  (1994).
174  See 11  U.S.C.  § 365(a)-(d).
175  See Klee, supra note 32, at 1475.
176  See U.C.C. § 1-201(37)  (1994); White, supra note 6, at 420.
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treat the arrangement as a lease, the arrangement must, for example,
not make the lessee bear the cost of depreciation and must terminate
before  the end of the asset's  life.177
To  the extent the lease  is functionally  different from a secured
loan,  it  is  likely to  impose  costs  on the  parties  that a secured  loan
would not impose.  For example, because  the lessee would not bear
the risk that the leased assets will fall in value by the end of the lease
term, it would have less incentive to properly use and maintain them.
The lessor must thus impose restrictions on the assets'  use and moni-
tor the lessee's compliance, a costly arrangement for both parties. 17 8
If these costs, which the parties would bear whether or not the lessee
goes  bankrupt, exceed  the lessor's  expected  costs  of acting  as  a se-
cured lender under partial priority, then the parties would not substi-
tute a lease for a secured loan under full priority.179
Even if current law permitted leases  structured  very similarly to
secured loans to receive lease  treatment in bankruptcy, courts  could
easily enforce  the partial-priority  rule by modifying the treatment of
leases in bankruptcy to conform it to that accorded  to secured loans.
To  the  extent  leases  are  similar  to  secured  loans,  no  economic  or
other justification  exists  for treating the arrangements  differently  in
bankruptcy.  Thus,  there  is no  reason why lessors  could not receive
less  favorable  treatment  in  bankruptcy  than  they currently  enjoy  if
that treatment were necessary  to enforce  a partial-priority rule. 80
177  See White, supra note 6, at 420.
178  See generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & L. MacDonald Wakeman, Determinants  of Corpo-
rate  LeasingPolicy,  40J. FIN. 895  (1985)  (discussing incentives that influence the decision to
enter a lease).
179  See Bossetti & Kurth, supra note 117, at 17.  There are other costs  to leasing.  For
example, if the marginal tax rate of the lessee is higher than that of the lessor, so that the
depreciation is worth more if the lessee owns the property, there will be a tax disadvantage
to leasing.  See Smith & Wakeman,  supra note 178,  at 897.  Furthermore,  the bankruptcy
treatment of leases  is not entirely favorable. If the debtor decides to breach  the lease, any
damage claim by the lessor will be treated as an unsecured general claim that arose before
bankruptcy.  In addition, the bankrupt firm may assign the lease to another party, notwith-
standing any anti-assignment provisions  in the lease  contract.  Thus,  the lessor  may find
itself in a contractual relationship into which it otherwise would not have chosen to enter.
180  Indeed, according  the lessor  less favorable  treatment  in bankruptcy-such  as  by
allowing the bankruptcy estate to reduce their payment obligations under lease contracts-
should yield efficiency benefits.  As we pointed out in The Uneasy Case, to  the extent that
leases and secured loans  are substitutes, they are likely to  give  rise to  the same  types of
efficiency  problems.  Bebchuk & Fried,  supra note  7, at  926-29.  In fact, covenants  that
public companies issue typically place similar restrictions on borrowers with respect to both
security interests and  leases.  See Morey W. McDaniel,  Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public
Debt Issues Obsolete?, 38 Bus. LAw.  867, 868  (1983).  Indeed, the only restrictions found in
the debentures of companies rated A or better are sale-leaseback restrictions and negative
pledge covenants, see id., suggesting that the two arrangements can  have similarly undesir-
able efficiency consequences.  Thus, even in a world without secured lending, there might
be  efficiency benefits  to giving lessors  less favorable  treatment in bankruptcy  than  they
currently enjoy.  For example, giving less favorable treatment may reduce  the use of ineffi-
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3.  The Use of Subsidiaries
One way firms might attempt to achieve the effect of full priority
under a rule of partial priority is to put in  a subsidiary the assets serv-
ing as collateral for a secured loan.1 8 1 The unsecured creditors of the
parent would not be able to reach the assets if the parent goes bank-
rupt, because,  in principle, their claims would have no more priority
in the assets of the subsidiary than the claims of the parent, the subsid-
iary's shareholder.  The creditor whose loan the subsidiary's assets  se-
cured would thus  effectively have full priority in  the assets.
There  are  a number  of reasons  why  this  strategy is  unlikely  to
substantially  undermine  a partial-priority  rule  in  bankruptcy.  First,
the creation of a subsidiary and the maintenance of corporate formali-
ties involves costs which are borne whether or not either the subsidi-
ary  or  the  parent  goes  bankrupt.  These  costs,  in  turn,  would
discourage  many  (but not all)  firms  from  pursuing  this  approach.
Second, this strategy is not without risk.  In  particular, the subsidiary's
activities  (including, perhaps, the ownership and lease or operation of
the  assets transferred to it by the parent) may  give rise to unsecured
claims-government claims, tort claims, or even trade claims-against
the  subsidiary  that erode  the priority  of the  secured  creditor whose
loan is secured by the subsidiary's assets.  These unsecured claims will
also  have full priority over any unsecured  claims  against the parent.
Thus,  to the extent  the parent itself borrows from sophisticated  un-
secured creditors,  the parent will pay a higher interest rate on these
loans.  Third, if it turns out that creditors widely use this strategy and
effectively  undermine  the  partial-priority  rule  in  bankruptcy,  bank-
ruptcy courts could consolidate the assets of, and claims  against, sub-
sidiaries and parents  to render the  strategy ineffective.'
8 2
4.  "Special  Purpose" or "Bankruptcy  Remote" Vehicles
An  increasing  number  of firms,  most  of them  large,  publicly-
traded  companies,  have  created  so-called  "special purpose vehicles"
("SPVs"),  also known as "bankruptcy-remote vehicles."'8 1 3  An SPV is a
cient lease arrangements which are used to give the lessor a better position in bankruptcy.
Another  possible  benefit  is that it might reduce  the  problem of inefficient rejection  of
leases.  SeeJesse  M. Fried, Executory Contracts and  Performance  Decisions  in Bankruptcy, 46 DuKE
L.J.  517,  545-66  (1996)  (explaining  how adjusting  the  price  of an  executory  contract
against  the  nonbankrupt  party  can  reduce  the  problem  of  excessive  rejection  in
bankruptcy).
181  See Bossetti & Kurth, supra note  117, at 16.
182  Consolidation  is  still  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  However,  given  bank-
ruptcy judges'  sympathy  for unsecured creditors  and  their considerable  discretion,  they
might become less reluctant to consolidate if they came  to believe that debtors were estab-
lishing subsidiaries primarily to avoid their liability to unsecured creditors.
183  See generally  Claire A.  Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetenerfor  Lemons, 74 WAsH.  U.
L.Q. 1061,  1062,  1076  (1996)  (discussing the costs and benefits of securitization).
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separate  legal  entity, typically a trust, that purchases  the borrower's
receivables with funds borrowed from public or private investors.  The
flow of income from the receivables  repays the investors.  If the firm
fails, the SPV, an independent entity, is unlikely to be forced into the
bankruptcy proceeding  (where, because of the  defacto partial-priority
system, the  receivables  backing the  SPV's  obligations  to  its creditors
could be compromised).  If secured creditors were to be given  even
less  priority  in  bankruptcy,  then  SPVs  would  become  even  more
attractive.
Nevertheless,  the possibility  of using  SPVs  is  unlikely  to under-
mine a partial-priority rule in bankruptcy.  First, at present, firms use
SPVs  only to isolate non-operating assets, such as receivables.' 84  Sec-
ond, it is expensive to set up an SPV.  Steven Schwarcz estimates that a
publicly-traded  SPV must issue at least $50  million of public debt be-
cause  of the high  transaction  costs,  effectively  making this means  of
financing unavailable  to small and medium-sized companies, the pri-
mary issuers of secured debt. 85  Third, SPVs may reduce, but do not
eliminate,  bankruptcy  risk.  As  Steven  Schwarcz  observes,  risk-averse
investors  are unwilling to lend funds to SPVs whose originating com-
panies are at risk of bankruptcy, indicating that there is still a material
risk that  SPV investors  will be  drawn  into a bankruptcy  proceeding
should the parent file for bankruptcy.
8 6
C.  Liquidation  of Collateral  Outside of Bankruptcy
Secured creditors might try to circumvent partial priority in bank-
ruptcy by seizing  collateral  outside  of bankruptcy  in  two ways.  The
first is to ensure that the borrower never enters bankruptcy, but rather
liquidates outside of bankruptcy.  The second is to seize the collateral
before the borrower enters bankruptcy.
184  When  receivables  capitalize  the SPV, the arrangement  is  equivalent to factoring.
See Paul M. Shupack,  On Boundaries and Definitions: A  Commentary on Dean Baird,  80 VA.  L.
REv. 2273, 2291  (1994).  When  the SPV is capitalized with operating assets that the corpo-
ration must use, the arrangement  will involve a lease of those assets  to the corporation,
with all of the risks and problems that leasing entails.  See supra  Part VI.B.2.
185  Steven  L. Schwarcz,  The Alchemy of  Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus.  & FIN.  133,
138-39  (1994).  In a conversation  with one of the authors, Schwarcz reported that an SPV
structure can be created for deals as small as $5 million (and perhaps less) if the funding is
obtained  through bank debt or private  placement.  While  the use of private  debt would
lower the costs of creating an SPV, many small and medium-sized companies will still not
have a sufficient amount of receivables to make  an SPV worthwhile.  Cf Allen N. Berger &
Gregory F. Udell, Relationship  Lending and  Lines of Credit in Small  Finn  Finance, 68J. Bus. 351
(1995)  (reporting that half of 3400 small businesses (including businesses with as much as
$219  million in assets)  surveyed in  1988-89 by the Federal Reserve  Board and the Small
Business Administration had assets  of $500,000  or less).
186  Schwarcz,  supra  note  185, at 137.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
1.  Firms That Liquidate Outside of Bankruptcy
Suppose that the secured  creditor believes  (correctly)  that a de-
faulting borrower has nothing to gain from entering bankruptcy, and
various  transaction  costs  and  information  problems  prevent  un-
secured  creditors from  filing an involuntary  bankruptcy petition.  In
such a case,  the secured creditor might repossess  the collateral  while
the  borrower liquidates  its business  outside of bankruptcy,  escaping
the effect of a partial-priority rule in bankruptcy.
To eliminate  this problem, the law could require that liquidating
companies report all of their transactions within the previous year and
submit  a list of unsecured  creditors  to  a bankruptcy  clearinghouse.
The  clearinghouse  would pass the  information on to the unsecured
creditors and "bounty hunters" who would receive a percentage of the
assets  recovered  from  the  secured  creditor. 1 87  To  enforce  the
mandatory bankruptcy filing requirement, the government could con-
dition limited liability for the firm's owners  on such a filing.'88
However,  even if the  law did not change to make these types  of
liquidations more difficult or impossible, liquidations outside of bank-
ruptcy that give  secured creditors full priority in their collateral and
leave unsecured  creditors'  claims unpaid are unlikely  to significantly
reduce  a  partial-priority  rule's  effectiveness.  First,  cases  in  which
neither  unsecured  creditors  nor the borrower  has anything  to  gain
from  bankruptcy  are  likely  to  involve  small  amounts  of assets  and
claims.  More importantly, when  a secured creditor extends credit, it
will not know if it can  avoid being subject to a partial-priority  rule in
bankruptcy.  Thus, in negotiating  its loan contract with  a borrower, it
will act as if there is some possibility that it will lose some of its priority
in bankruptcy.189
187  There are other possibilities.  See LoPucki, supra note  11,  at 1503-05.
188  In his Symposium article, Lynn LoPucki  suggests that implementing a mandatory
bankruptcy  filing requirement would require  specifying  the  circumstances  under which
criminal liability (for failure to file)  is imposed.  Id. at 1505-06.  But we doubt that criminal
enforcement would be necessary if, as we suggest, owners  (or, if appropriate, managers)  of
a borrower that has not yet filed for bankruptcy can be held liable for the borrower's debts
by the borrower's creditors.  In such a case, those controlling the borrower would have an
incentive  to file for bankruptcy  as soon as they are sued by an unsecured creditor.
189  In his Symposium  article, Lynn LoPucki  argues  that a secured  creditor would at-
tempt to avoid the reach of a partial-priority rule in bankruptcy by including provisions in
the loan arrangement that give the debtor an  incentive to participate voluntarily in an out-
of-bankruptcy liquidation that benefits the secured creditor.  Id. at 1498-99.  In particular,
a secured creditor might demand that the owners personally guarantee the debtor's obliga-
tion to the secured creditor.  Such a guarantee would give the owners an incentive to maxi-
mize  the secured creditors'  recovery in the event of the debtor's failure.
While personal guarantees might be used as part of a strategy to avoid partial priority
in  bankruptcy,  their use would  achieve  directly  one of the results  that partial  priority  is
intended  to achieve indirectly:  namely, to reduce the debtor's incentive and ability  to en-
gage in excessively risky activities.  Partial priority  achieves this indirectly by giving secured
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2.  Firms That Give Secured Creditors Their Collateral  Prior  to
Bankruptcy
The secured creditor may expect that the borrower or unsecured
creditors  (which would have an interest, under a partial-priority  rule
in bankruptcy, to see  the borrower enter bankruptcy)  would eventu-
ally file a bankruptcy petition.  As we explain below, the secured credi-
tor's  ability  to  "opt out"  of partial  priority  by seizing  its  collateral
before bankruptcy would likely be very limited.
Consider  first a debtor  that intends  to resist repossession.  The
secured  creditor  would  be  unable  to  repossess  unless  the  contract
gives it the right to declare  a default and seize  the collateral.  Even if
the creditor has the right to declare a default under the loan contract,
its ability to seize the collateral will usually be very restricted.  In par-
ticular, the secured creditor may not seize  the collateral  if, by doing
so, it would breach the peace.190  Since most commercial collateral is
located on the borrower's property and is thus difficult to access with-
out the  borrower's  cooperation,  this  breach-of-the-peace  restriction
makes it virtually impossible for secured  creditors to engage in "self-
help" repossession.  As a result, the secured creditor would almost al-
ways need to enlist the judicial system's help in recovering the collat-
eral, providing  the borrower with  ample  time  to  file for bankruptcy
and invoke the automatic stay.
Next, consider a debtor that would not resist, and may even assist
in, repossession. 191  Under  a rule  of partial  priority,  a repossession
(within a statutorily defined period, usually 90 days)  would violate the
creditors  an incentive  to monitor debtors; a guarantee  does so directly by increasing the
cost to  the  debtor's owners  of failure.  In effect,  a personal  guarantee is equivalent  to  a
partial waiver of limited liability.  Because limited liability  is what gives  rise to inefficient
borrower  behavior  in  the first instance,  see Bebchuk  & Fried, supra note 7, at 873-75,  a
partial waiver  of limited liability  is likely to  be desirable.
LoPucki  suggests  that the secured  creditor might also  negotiate  for provisions  that
enable the secured creditor to assume control of the debtor should it suffer financial dis-
tress.  LoPucki, supra note 11,  at 1499.  We suspect that in many cases these provisions will
not be effective.  First, lender liability law and the possibility of equitable subordination in
bankruptcy might deter a secured creditor from attempting to take control of a debtor and
liquidating  its  assets.  Second, in  those  cases  where  a secured  creditor  nevertheless  at-
tempts to  take  control  of the  debtor in  order  to  liquidate it-and the  owners  did not
personally guarantee the debtor's loans-the owners would have an incentive to resist the
takeover by filing for bankruptcy.
However,  to the extent such arrangements  are effective,  they would increase  the po-
tential cost of financial distress to the owners of the debtor by putting their ownership and
control at greater risk.  This, in turn, would reduce  owners'  incentives to engage in unde-
sirably  risky activities.  Therefore, such  arrangements  (if effective)  would have  the same
desirable ex ante effects on the debtors as personal guarantees from the owners, albeit to a
lesser degree  because, unlike  personal guarantees,  such arrangements would not expose
all of the owner's wealth to risk of loss.
190  See U.C.C.  § 9-503  (1994).
191  See LoPucki, supra note 11,  at 1498-99.
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preference  rules  (Section  547  of the Bankruptcy  Code)  by  enabling
the  repossessing  secured  creditor  to  obtain  more  than  it would  in
bankruptcy.  Section 547 would thus permit the bankruptcy trustee to
undo such a transfer.  Thus, the secured creditor's repossession might
cause  sophisticated  unsecured  creditors  to  force  the  borrower  into
bankruptcy before the preference  period had expired so that the col-
lateral could be recovered and its value could, at least in part, be used
to satisfy their claims.192  In fact, under current law, unsecured credi-
tors often force a firm into bankruptcy after the firm grants a security
interest to another creditor, so that they can attack the transfer of the
security interest under Section  547,193  even though the law makes  it
both difficult and risky for unsecured creditors to initiate involuntary
bankruptcy filings. 194  Thus, even if a secured creditor could physically
repossess its collateral, it might be reluctant to incur the cost of repos-
session, knowing  that  unsecured creditors  would be likely to simply
undo the  repossession  by filing  a bankruptcy  petition and  attacking
the  transfer under Section  547.195
192  In  his  Symposium  article,  Lynn  LoPucki  describes  a strategy  secured  creditors
could, in principle, use to defeat the preference  rules: a single-purpose entity is created to
lend money  to, and  take a security  interest  in, the  property of a borrower.  Should the
borrower default, the entity seizes the collateral, sells it at foreclosure for a fraction of its
value  to a related party, and then distributes the proceeds of the sale to the owners of the
entity, leaving  the entity an empty shell.  See  id. at 1507-09.  However,  we  think that this
strategy would not be used on any significant scale.  First, the transfer of the proceeds  to
the owners as well as the transfer of the collateral to a related party for less than reasonably
equivalent value would be considered fraudulent transfers  that could, in principle, be re-
versed by the bankruptcy  trustee.  To the extent that lenders believe that the trustee will
simply undo the transfers, they will have no incentive to engage in this strategy.  Even if in
practice it would be difficult for the bankruptcy trustee to undo the transfers, many lenders
would not engage in such transactions for fear of adverse publicity.  Those not deterred by
the possibility  of negative  publicity might not find it worthwhile to create  a separate  legal
entity for each loan transaction  (because the transaction costs would be incurred not only
in  those  cases where  there  is  a  foreclosure,  but in  the  overwhelming  majority of cases
where the borrower fully repays the loan).  To the extent that there would still be lenders
inclined  to use such vehicles,  stiffer penalties  could be  imposed  on  those  receiving  the
proceeds or otherwise  profiting from the transactions.
193  See LoPucki, supra note 60, at 1927 (reporting that, in a sample of large companies
that declared bankruptcy, unsecured creditors filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions when
the borrower issued a security interest to existing lenders which had originally made their
advances  on an unsecured basis).
194  See LoPucki, supra  note  11,  at 1492-93,  1499-1500.
195  Lynn LoPucki argues that unsecured creditors are unlikely to file many involuntary
petitions  if a partial-priority  rule is adopted.  Id. at 1500-02.  One  reason  is  that under
current bankruptcy rules parties filing involuntary petitions face significant risk of liability.
See id. at 1499-1500.  The other reason is that there would be little benefit to the unsecured
creditor filing the petition.  Any value that is made available by a partial-priority rule in the
bankruptcy proceeding may be used  to pay administrative expenses.  Whatever is left must
then be shared pro rata with other ordinary unsecured creditors.  See id. at 1500.  LoPucki
suggests that an unsecured  creditor would thus be better off bargaining with  the secured
creditor for a side-payment in exchange for not filing a bankruptcy petition.  Id. at 1501-03.
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VII
A NOTE  ON THE  CURENr  CoNTROVaRSES  OVER ARTIcLE  9
This Part briefly remarks on how our analysis  relates to some  of
the issues raised at the Symposium regarding  the current revision of
Article 9.  The American Law Institute ("ALI")  and the National Con-
ference  of Commissioners  on Uniform  State  Laws  ("NCCUSL")  are
now in the process  of revising UCC Article  9,  the body of rules that
permits  a  lender  to  take  security  interests  in virtually  all  of a bor-
rower's personal  (moveable or intangible)  property.  Most of the revi-
sions  the  ALI and  the  NCCUSL  are  considering  tend  to  further
strengthen the position  of secured creditors:  they either extend  the
reach of Article 9 to property currently not covered by the statute (in-
cluding  certain bank deposits, tort claims,  and insurance  claims)  or
make it easier for secured creditors to achieve priority in their Article
9 collateral  over the claims  of third parties  (such as unsecured credi-
tors or the borrower's bankruptcy trustee).196  In part, these revisions
are intended  to reverse  some  of the  erosion of priority  that has re-
sulted from courts interpreting Article  9 against secured creditors. 197
However, a revision drafted by Elizabeth Warren at the request of
the ALI Council goes in the exact opposite  direction: it would "carve
out" a portion of a debtor's Article 9 collateral to pay the claims of the
debtor's unsecured creditors. 19 8  Under the so-called "Carve-out Pro-
posal," as much  as 20%  of the debtor's Article  9  collateral would be
made available to pay the claims of 'Judgment creditors"-  unsecured
creditors with unpaid judgments against the debtor-that have levied
on that collateral. 199
LoPucki  might be right that, if other bankruptcy  rules are not changed, unsecured
creditors would generally prefer to extract a side-payment rather than file for bankruptcy.
But we should emphasize two points: the first is that such side-payments will have the effect
of giving the secured creditor only partial priority in its collateral (although  the degree of
priority will be greater than if the secured creditor were brought into the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding).  Second, bankruptcy rules could be changed to  eliminate  the disincentives  and
increase  the incentives to file involuntary petitions.  LoPucki  himself offers one proposal
for increasing the incentives to file involuntary petitions: giving a bounty to the filing credi-
tor.  Although LoPucki notes that such a system would not be effective in the 6ase where
the irreversible nonbankruptcy liquidation  takes place before the petitioning creditors are
eligible  to file, id. at 1504, the preference period could be extended  from ninety days  to
one year, making most nonbankruptcy  liquidations reversible.
196  See Klee,  supra note 32, at 1467 n.2.
197  See Woodward,  supra  note 13, at 1519  n.45.
198  Warren, supra note 12.
199  See id.
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A.  The Effort to Expand the Scope of (and Rationalize)
Article 9
Let us first consider the efforts to expand the scope  of Article  9
and reduce the transaction  costs associated with personal-property  se-
cured lending.  Expanding the scope of Article  9 may or may not be
desirable from an efficiency perspective.  Suppose  that the proposed
expansion of Article 9 would enable creditors to take security interests
in certain types  of assets that, until now, could not be used as collat-
eral (under Article 9 or otherwise).  The use of these security interests
would give rise to priority-independent  costs and benefits and priority-
dependent  costs  and  benefits.  The  use  of such  security  interests
might  also  affect  the  mix  of value-increasing  and  value-decreasing
projects  that are  financed.  The desirability  of enabling creditors  to
create  such security interests would depend on whether the benefits
exceed  the costs.
Because the priority-dependent costs and benefits of these secur-
ity interests  depend  on  the degree  of priority  accorded  to  secured
claims  in bankruptcy,  the overall desirability of expanding the scope
of Article 9 might depend on whether there is full or partial priority in
bankruptcy.  (Similarly, the desirability of full or partial priority might
depend on the types of assets that can serve as collateral for a security
interest.)  It should be emphasized, however, that the issues of priority
and the scope of Article 9 are otherwise independent.  There are two
separate questions:  (1)  should it be possible to create an Article 9 se-
curity interest in all types ofpersonal property assets, and  (2)  should
security interests have partial priority in bankruptcy?  Even  if one be-
lieves that it would be preferable to give less priority to secured claims
in bankruptcy  than they enjoy currently, one  can  also believe  that it
would be desirable to enable  creditors to take security interests in all
personal-property  assets (regardless of the priority regime).  Similarly,
one may believe that it is optimal to give full priority to security inter-
ests in certain  types  of assets, while,  at the  same time, believing that
certain  types  of assets should not be permitted to  serve  as  collateral
under any regime  of priority.
The  net effect of reducing the  transaction  costs  associated  with
Article  9 lending could also  be either positive  or negative.  Consider
Article  9 security interests that firms would use in any event. With re-
spect to  these  security interests,  it is  clearly desirable  to  reduce  the
transaction  costs associated with their use.  Now consider Article  9 se-
curity interests that firms would use only if the transaction costs associ-
ated with  their  use  are  reduced  by  the  proposed  rationalization  of
Article 9.  With respect to these security interests, a reduction in trans-
action  costs  could have  either positive  or negative  efficiency  effects,
depending on whether the  resulting increase  in the use of Article  9
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security interests is desirable.  The use of these security interests would
be desirable to the extent that they add value to transactions, but un-
desirable to the extent that they make  the transactions  less efficient.
Similarly, to the extent the reduction  in transaction  costs  permits fi-
nancing of good projects,  this would be  desirable.  Likewise,  to the
extent such a reduction gives rise to loans for bad projects, the effect
would be undesirable.
B.  The "Carve-Out Proposal"
Contributors  to  this  Symposium  and  others have  discussed  the
details and design of the "Carve-out proposal."2 00  Here, we will simply
make some brief general points about an Article 9 collateral carve-out
rule.
An Article  9 carve-out rule would differ from the partial-priority
rules we consider in three important respects.  First, the carve-out ap-
plies only to personal property, while the partial-priority rules we put
forward  apply  both  to  personal  and real  property. 201  Second,  the
carve-out rule "carves out" a portion of a secured creditor's collateral
for unsecured claims, while the partial-priority rules "carve out" a por-
tion of the secured  creditor's secured  claim and make it unsecured.
The  difference  is  as  follows:  under  the  carve-out  rule,  a  secured
lender could completely insulate itself from risk of loss by oversecur-
ing its loan.  Under our partial-priority  rules, a lender could not, be-
cause  its secured  claim  would be  subject  to a  cut-back.  Third,  the
carve-out rule applies both inside and outside of bankruptcy;  our par-
tial-priority rules apply only in bankruptcy.
The  first  difference  between  our  partial-priority  rules  and  the
carve-out rule is  that the carve-out rule would apply only to Article 9
personal-property  collateral.  Personal property  accounts  for  only a
fraction of the collateral backing secured  debt in the United States,
perhaps as little as 10%.202  A 20% carve-out rule might thus carve out
as little as 2%  of total business collateral for unsecured creditors.  The
200  See,  e.g.,  Bossetti  & Kurth, supra note 117;  Klee,  supra note 32; Woodward,  supra
note 13,  at 1511.
201  Many of the partial-priority rules that other countries have considered or adopted
apply only to personal  property  (or specific types  of personal property).  See Eisenberg &
Sundgren, supra  note 39 (discussing bankruptcy laws in Finland); Bebchuk & Fried, supra
note  7, at 909-10  (discussing  1985  German Bankruptcy Commission proposal).  In 1982,
the U.K.'s Cork Commission proposed a more limited version of the fixed-fraction priority
rule  under which  10%  of the  property  subject  to  floating  charges  (such  as inventory)
would be made  available  to pay unsecured claims.  See Goode, supra note 44, at 66-67.
202  See Picker, supra  note 5, at 649-50 (estimating real property mortgage debt at $3.85
trillion,  automobile-backed  debt at $285  billion,  and $96 billion  of other debt, secured
primarily by personal  property).  These  figures presumably include both commercial and
non-commercial  loans.  Thus, the percentage  of commercial  secured  debt that Article  9
collateral backs could be more or less than 10%.  See Mann,  supra  note 11,  at 12  n.4.
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benefits (and costs) of an Article 9 carve-out rule would thus be lower
than the benefits of a partial-priority rule that applies to both real and
personal property security interests.
The second difference  is that the carve-out rule applies to collat-
eral,  while  the  partial-priority  rules  apply  to  claims.  As  explained
above, under the carve-out rule, a secured creditor  could insulate  it-
self from risk of loss by oversecuring the loan  (taking collateral worth
at  least 125%  of the  amount it  expects  to be  owed  in the  event of
default).  Thus,  even  if the  carve-out  rule  applied  both to  personal
and real  property, one would expect it to  lead to  less monitoring  of
borrowers  than a rule such as the fixed-fraction rule, which always ex-
poses a secured lender to  risk of loss.
Third, the carve-out rule would operate both inside and outside
of bankruptcy, while our rules would operate only in bankruptcy.  The
carve-out rule would have the advantage of reaching a larger number
of insolvent companies.  However, it would also apply to solvent com-
panies,  creating  potential  costs  without  generating  any  offsetting
benefits.
CONCLUSION
This Article  has  responded  to  criticisms  of The  Uneasy Case and
further developed  the  analysis  of that article.  The analysis  confirms
our  earlier  conclusion  that the  case  for the full priority  of secured
claims in bankruptcy is an uneasy one.  The contributions to this Sym-
posium and the discussion during its sessions suggest to us that many
others are coming around to accept this view.
In closing, however,  we wish  to  caution  against rushing to con-
clude  that a partial-priority  rule  would  be superior  to full  priority.
Much  more work needs  to  be done  before  one  can determine  with
confidence which rule would be desirable.  We hope that our articles
can provide a useful basis and agenda for such future work.
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